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Summary findings
Both consumers and the government benefited from  Menard and Clarke discuss the mechanisms that made
reform of the water system in Conakry, Guinea, whose  progress possible and identify factors that inhibit the
deterioration since independence had become critical by  positive effects of reform.
the mid-1980s. Less than 40 percent of Conakry's  Water has become very expensive, the number of
population had access to piped water - low even by  connections has increased very slowly, and conflicts have
regional standards - and service was intermittent, at  developed between SEEG (the private operator) and
best, for the few who had connections. The public  SONEG (the state agency). Among the underlying
agency in charge of the sector was inefficient,  problems:
overstaffed, and virtually insolvent.  *  The lack of strong, stable institutions.
In several ways, the reform introduced to the sector in  *  The lack of an independent agency capable of
1989 under a World Bank-led project was remarkable. It  restraining arbitrary government action, regulating the
showed that even in a weak institutional environment,  private operator, and enforcing contractual
where contracts are hard to enforce and political  arrangements.
interference is common, private sector participation can  *  The lack of adequate conflict resolution mechanisms
improve sector performance.  for contract disputes.
* Weak administrative capacity.
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The performance of Conakry's water system, which had been deteriorating since
independence, had become critical by the mid-1980s.  The public agency in charge of the
sector, the Enterprise Nationale de Distribution  de l'Eau Guineenne (DEG) was inefficient,
overstaffed and virtually insolvent.  Less than 40% of Conakry's population had access to
piped water - low even by regional standards  - and service was intermittent, at best, for the
lucky few with connections. By  1983, residents had to line up at neighbors'  connections
and standpipes for hours, hoping for service.  Many residents used polluted well water as
their primary source of drinking water and even more relied upon it as a secondary source
when the piped system was not operating.  Consequently, water-borne diseases, including
cholera and diarrhea,  had become a major problem. Further, after disappointing results from
previous investment projects, donors, including the World Bank, were becoming frustrated.
The poor, and deteriorating, performance of the sector convinced many observers that
significant reform was necessary.
In 1989, after several years of discussions and delays, the government signed a lease
contract with a majority privately owned enterprise that covered operations and maintenance
of  all  urban water systems in  Guinea.  A  newly created public  enterprise was  given
ownership of sector assets and responsibility for investment. At the same time, a large World
Bank-led project, the Second Water Supply Project, was approved, allowing for expansion
and rehabilitation  of the system.
In  several  ways,  the  reform  was  quite  remarkable,  requiring  significant
commitments from private investors in an institutional environment that imposed very few
limits  on arbitrary  government action.  Guinea was ruled, at that  time,  by  a military
government and there was no elected legislature or independent judiciary to restrain the
executive.  Further, informal constraints, such as traditions of regulatory or bureaucratic
independence, were also very weak.  The World Bank, which was heavily involved in the
design and implementation of the contract, had to implement new internal procedures to
handle the arrangement and it was not clear to the partners how well the system would
work.
DEG's disastrous performance made the reform desirable.  However, in many other
countries, sector-specific crises have not been sufficient motivation for private participation
in  this sector.'  In Guinea, four additional factors encouraged substantial change.  First,
' See, for example,  the discussion  of Lima in Alcazar, Xu and Zuluaga  (1999) and Mexico  City in
Haggarty,  Brook  and Zuluaga  (1999). Further,  the performance  of the sector  in Guinea  has been very  poor
for  many years  before  reform  was initiated.
1DEG's  poor management and performance, rather than less tractable problems such as
scarcity or the high cost of raw water, was the main reason for the sector's problems.
Consequently, the introduction  of private sector participation  could be expected to improve
the situation.  Second, the military government that came to power following the death of
President Sekou Toure did not rely heavily upon support from the urban elite who were used
to receiving free water.  This allowed the government to implement large price increases,
allowing tariffs to cover operating expenses and provide a fair return on capital.  Third,
privatization was consistent  with governments  philosophy of liberalizing  and privatizing the
economy, which was demonstrated  by the structural adjustment  program that the government
was implementing  in response to the macroeconomic  crisis that hit Guinea in the mid-  1980s.
Finally, bilateral and multilateral donors, who were pushing for reform, had significant
leverage,  since, in addition  to financing  the structural adjustment  programn,  they also financed
most sector investment.
Although the weak institutional framework did not prevent the private sector from
becoming involved in the sector, it has affected the success of reform.  In practice, no
independent body exists that is able to enforce the contracts between the various parties
involved in the sector and the government. Consequently, many useful contract provisions
have proven ineffective (e.g., provisions requiring that the govermnent pay its water bill,
allowing for intemational arbitration in  the case of  dispute between the partners, and
enforcing performance targets). Further, in the absence of a neutral party that can mediate
disputes and enforce its decisions, disagreements  between the different parties have had to
be  settled  at the  highest levels  of government.  These problems have  slowed sector
development and poisoned relations between the public enterprise, the private operator and
the government. For example, one of the main reasons that the price of water has become
high is that the collection rate has remained low.  This, in turn, is because the government
has refused to pay its water bill and because the weak judicial system makes it difficult to
collect from private consumers who refuse to pay.
Notwithstanding these problems, the bottom line from this study is that all parties
have benefited from reform.  On aggregate, increased coverage and improved quality more
than compensated consumers for higher prices.  Further, government subsidies have been
reduced and the foreign investors have made modest, but  positive, profits.  Under the
circumstances, it is unlikely that the public operator, DEG, would have had greater success
than the private operator has had - especially given its disastrous record before reform and
the poor compliance with provisions in the public enterprise's contract.  This shows that
even in a weak institutional environment,  where contracts are hard to enforce and political
interference is common, private sector participation can improve sector performance.
This paper discusses the mechanisms that makes progress possible, even in difficult
institutional environments,  and identifies  factors that inhibit the potentially positive effects of
2reform. Section  II describes the situation in Guinea  before reform. Section III describes  the
sector  crisis  at  the  time  of  reform.  Section IV  examines  the  political  economic
circumstances that affected the decision and the design of reform.  Section V analyzes the
contractual arrangement  and its implementation. Section VI evaluates  the outcome.  Section
VII goes beyond standard performance  measures and presents results from a cost-benefit
analysis.  Section  VIII  concludes  and  discusses  options  that  might  improve  sector
performance.
2.  Guinea at the Time of Reform
In many ways, the collapse of the water system mirrored a collapse in Guinea's
economy, and many of the problems that affected DEG affected the entire public sector.
By the time that reform was enacted  in 1989,  Guinea,  with a per capita GDP of US $430, was
one of the poorest countries in the world (World Bank, 1990d). Further, life expectancy at
birth (43 years) and the infant mortality  rate (143 deaths  per 1000 births) were both below the
average for Sub-Saharan  Africa (51 years and 108 deaths  per 1000  births). This was not due
to a lack of natural resources.  In fact, due to its vast mineral wealth and its fertile land,
Guinea had been seen as one of the most promising colonies in French West Africa before
independence. Instead, Guinea's problems were primarily the result of years of economic
mismanagement  by the socialist regime led by President Sekou Toure.
Before independence, due to vigorous campaigning by Sekou Toure and the Parti
Democratique de  Guinee (PDG), which  dominated pre-independence politics,  Guinea
rejected membership of the French Community proposed by  General de Gaulle.  This
prompted an immediate withdrawal of French expatriates and a  swift end to technical
assistance, budgetary aid, and trade preferences. Since the PDG held the majority of seats
in the regional assembly, Sekou Toure automatically became President.  He  used his
position to  set up  a  one-party state, introducing  'African Socialism'  and  imposing a
dictatorship based on personal and clan ties.  President Toure's fear of being overthrown -
known as the permanent plot - resulted in the arrest, persecution, and torture of any real, or
imagined, opponents, which, in turn, led to a mass exodus of Guineans. 2
The  Toure  regime's  policies  led  to  state  domination of  the  economy  and
urbanization. Following independence, most enterprises, in both trade and industry, were
quickly nationalized and cooperative farns were set up in rural areas. To subsidize urban
consumption, the government tried to keep prices of agricultural products low.  These
policies were sustained by the suppression of private trade and by forcing farmers to sell
their produce at prices that, by  1984, were lower than the estimated cost of production
2  By 1984,  it was estimated  that as many as 2 million  refugees  were living  in neighboring  countries
(EIU,  3rd Quarter  1984,  p.30),  at a time  when  the population  was only  about  5  million  (World  Bank,  1998a).
3(AruIpragasam and Sahn,  1997, p.55).  The long-term results were predictable.  People
living in rural areas withdrew from the state by turning to barter, subsistence farming,
smuggling and the black market.'  Meanwhile, agricultural production and exports fell
dramatically. 4
These  policies  also
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Source: United  Nations  (1996)  and World  Bank  (1997b).  early 1990s, it remained fast due
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neighboring Sierra Leone and Liberia.  Rapid population growth, combined with  poor
urban planning and inadequate investment, quickly overwhelmed Conakry's infrastructure,
including its water system. 5
Despite the strong performance of the partly foreign-owned and run mining sector,
the Guinean economy rapidly deteriorated. 6 Rapid expansion of the civil service led to a
huge public sector wage bill, even though salaries were falling in real terms. 7 Although
wages  were  supplemented with  benefits  such  as  access to  goods  at  official prices,
transportation allowances, and access to free piped water, it became nearly impossible to
See Azarya and Chazan (1986) for a discussion of this phenomenon in Guinea.
4 Whereas agricultural products made up 71% of total exports in 1957, they made up less than 1% of
total exports by 1981 (Arulpragasam and Sahn, p.37).
5 A Center for Privatization study conducted for USAID discusses the state of Conakry's infrastructure
in the mid 1980s (Marston et al., 1986,  p. 46)
6  World Bank estimates suggest that 97% of exports were Bauxite or Alumina by the mid-1980s and
that about 30% of govermment  revenue came from the mining sector in 1984 (World Bank, 1986). Guinea's
stock of disbursed and outstanding debt increased from 25% of GDP in 1975 to 62% of GDP in 1985 and the
debt servicing requirement had reached 43% of total exports by 1983 (World Bank, 1990b,  p.9).
7 Although the First Republic did not formally document finances or produce an accurate government
budget, it is clear that public finances were in disarray. In the 1970s, public sector employment grew by 7%
per year and although civil service wages were frozen between 1965 and  1980, they accounted for between
50 and 60% of government expenditures by the mid-1980s (De Merode, 1994, p. 170).
4support a  family on  a  civil  servant's  salary.  Consequently, civil  servants turned to
corruption and moonlighting to make ends meet. 8
In addition to increasing the size of the government, these policies also increased
the influence of the PDG.  Price controls, rationing and control of production greatly
increased the potential for patronage, making links to the PDG a way of gaining access to
jobs, rations at official prices, education and connections to the water system. 9 Foreign
exchange obtained from the sale of cash crops was used to subsidize the consumption of
civil servants and party officials, while low subsidized prices for food crops benefited
urban consumers. Since both the civil service and the PDG were concentrated in Conakry,
President Tour&  became reliant upon urban areas for support.  Although protests in 1978
resulted in modest liberalization,  the pace was predictably slow since many of the reforms
(e.g., privatization, civil service reductions and price liberalization) would harm his urban
supporters." 0
On  March  24,  1984, during  preparations  for  the  up-coming meeting  of  the
Organization for  African Unity (OAU) in Conakry, President Toure had a heart attack,
dying two days later.  President TourW's  notorious fear of plots, especially by potential
rivals, meant that there was no clear successor and, therefore, a lengthy power struggle
seemed likely.  This process, however, was cut short on April 3, when several top army
officers,  led  by  Colonel  (now  General)  Lansana  Conte,  seized  power.  The  new
government moved quickly to consolidate power and sweep away the remnants of the
Toure regime.  The Parti Democratique  de Guinee (PDG) and the unions were outlawed,
political prisoners were released and Camp Boiro, where President Toure had imprisoned
and tortured opponents, was closed.  After years of repression, the new regime received
8 By 1984,  the average  salary  was estimated  to cover  only about 25% of the cost of living,  even after
imcluding  the rice  rations  and other  commodities  used  to supplement  salaries  (Marston,  Thomas  and Love,
1986).
9  Arulpragasam  and Sahn  (1997,  p.11)  note that PDG  officials  "exercised  control  over everything  from
employment  in state  enterprises  to access  to foreign  exchange  at  official  rates."
ID After  the 1978  demonstrations  by market  women  throughout  the  country,  the  Tour6  regime  started  to
tentatively  implement  reform  (see  Young,  1982).  The  protests  were  sparked  by an order  to close  all village
markets,  which  was intended  to give the state-owned  cooperatives  a monopoly  over retail trade and
-culninated  with  marches  on the  presidential  palace  on  August  27 and  28, 1978.  Although  the  women  were
driven  from  the  palace  when  the  guards  opened  fire,  President  Tour6  quickly  rescinded  the  order  that  sparked
the  protest  and  started  liberalizing  parts  of the  economy.  By  1983,  several  enterprises  were  given  operational
autonomy  (e.g.,  over  employment  and pricing),  15%  of public  sector  workers  were  released  (although  the
policy  of guaranteeing  employment  for graduates  was continued)  and several  business  units of public
enterprises  were  disbanded.  The  government,  however,  refused  to implement  several  other  reforms.  Most
notably,  the  government  was  firmly  opposed  to realigning  the  exchange  rate,  since  access  to hard  currency
and  imported  goods  at  subsidized  rates  were  among  the  benefits  enjoyed  by the  high-level  civil  servants  and
PDG  party  members.
5widespread support from the public, signaled by huge and festive demonstrations. Because
of this goodwill, and because it did not depend upon urban areas for support, the new
military  government could consider policies to  liberalize the  economy that  had  been
rejected or delayed by the Toure regime.
3.  A Badly Needed Reform: Circumstances in the Water Sector
In 1983, while President Tour6 was still president, a group of international experts
was invited into  Guinea to  evaluate Conakry's  water system and  to  suggest ways of
improving sector performance."  By this time, sector problems were becoming critical.
Despite substantial loans from  international donors, coverage was low  and many  non-
connected residents drank polluted water from wells.  Because of this, waterbome diseases
were the main cause of death for infants and children and there were periodic  cholera
epidemics.  The public enterprise responsible for the sector, the Enterprise Nationale de
Distribution de V'Eau Guineenne (DEG), was poorly managed, overstaffed, and practically
insolvent.  Although the consultant's report suggested several reform options, and despite
pressure  from  international  donors  and  the  systems  deteriorating  performance,  the
government did not act quickly.  It was not until 1989 that the mnilitary  government that
replaced Sekou Toure finally enacted sector reform. In this section of the paper, we describe
the situation prior to reforn  and discuss reasons for the sectors  poor performance.
3.1  Sector Performance Prior to Reform
Sector organization. Prior to reform, a public agency, the Enterprise Nationale de
Distribution de I'Eau Guin&enne  (DEG) was responsible for operations, maintenance and
investment in  Conakry and  other urban areas.  Theoretically, DEG was an  autonomous
agency within the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment (MNRE) and, under its
statutes, its board contained representative from several ministries.  However, in practice,
its board never met and the MNRE treated it as it would any other department (Triche,
1990, p.10).  Consequently, DEG had no autonomy and suffered from the same problems
that plagued the rest of the civil service during, and following, President Toure's regime.
For example, before the military coup that followed President Toure's death, the policy of
guaranteeing employment to university graduates meant that DEG, like the rest of the civil
service, was extremely overstaffed.
Water resources.  Despite the sector's problems, scarcity has never been a major
problem in Guinea,  which, due to its abundant rainfall, has earned the reputation of being the
"  The group, which was coordinated  by  SONEDE (Tunisia) and Lyonnaise des Eaux (France),
submitted  their  report in March  1985.
6'water tower of  Africa'.  Although water from the Conakry aquifer is unsuitable for
drinking because it is highly polluted, due to the use of pit latrines, and saline, due to
proximity to the ocean, a safe source of abundant fresh water is available.' 3 The reservoir at
Grandes Chutes, which is located about 60km from the city, could produce over 500,000
m3/day (World  Bank, 1989). In comparison,  DEG's average production  in Conakry was only
44,000 m3/day in 1985 (and total production remained at only 68,000 m3/day in 1996).'4
Further, because Grandes Chutes is located 233 meters above sea level, the system can be
gravity-fed, reducing the cost of water.  Although potential production was high, actual
productive capacity was limited by the transmission  pipeline from the Grandes Chutes dam,
which could carry  only 45,000m 3/day.
Low connection rate  Despite the abundant water supply, coverage was very low
before reform - we estimate that less than 40 percent of the population of the city had access
to piped water in 1989.15 According to data from SEEG, there were 3,100 legal unbilled
connections for deputies, senior civil  servants and DEG employees and  10,200 billed
connections in 1989. At this time, the population of Conakry was close to one million.  In
comparison,  Abidjan in C6te d'Ivoire, which was about twice the size of Conakry, had over
111,505 connections (SODECI, 1990). Most private connections  were a single tap inside a
lot or compound - only a small wealthy minority had running water inside their house -
usually serving many households (Durany and Morel a l'Huissier, 1994, p.19).  According
to field interviews, whether a household had a connection depended primarily on personal
links (e.g., tribal and family) and fidelity to the Sekou Toure regime.  For this reason, a
household's capacity  to provide water to neighbors rapidly became  part of its power, prestige,
and control.
Although it is difficult to estimate the exact number, many other Conakry residents
had illegal connections to the system.  In 1992, three years after the private operator took
control of the company, Castilia (1993) estimated  that there were 4000 illegal connections in
12 Average annual rainfall in Conakry is about 4.2 meters (World Bank 1990c, p.46).  In comparison,
annual  rainfall  in Abidjan  is 2.0 meters,  in Buenos  Aires 1.0  meters,  in Mexico  City 0.6 meters,  in Santiago
0.3 meters and in Lima 0.001 meters (Source: International Station Meteorological Climate Survey, Version
4.0).
'3 World Bank (1989) also notes that the complex geography of the Conakry peninsula makes it difficult
to abstract significant amounts of water from boreholes.
14  Data are from World Bank (1987) and World Bank (1998a). Additional  water was available from the
Kakirnbon  well field (7,000m 3/day) and Kakloulima  Springs  (2,000m 3/day).
15  According to data from SEEG, there were about 13,300 legal (billed and unbilled) connections in
1989.  In addition, there were 40 operational standpipes in 1989 (World Bank, 1989, p.3).  Assuming 27
people per connection (see footnote 61), 1000 people per standpipe (see footnote 61) and population from
United Nations (1996), this implies a coverage rate of 38% in 1989. This omits people who obtained water
from illegal connections.  However, it also does not take into account that service interruptions meant that
people with connections  had to use water from wells as a secondary  water source.
7Conakry, compared to 13,371 legal connections." 6 Since a private operator, operating along
commercial  lines, presumably  has greater reason to reduce  the number of illegal connections,
it is likely there were significantly  more illegal connections  before reform.
In part, the low connection rate was the result of rapid urban growth due, in part, to
policies that encouraged urbanization.  Problems related to fast growth were exacerbated
by poor urban planning, something that remains a problem today.  Service delivery and
system expansion were difficult and costly because the poor road network made it difficult
to lay pipes and because a relatively small number of potential customers were spread over
a  wide  area.  Consequently,  even  if  maintenance had  been  adequate,  Conakry's
infrastructure  would have been strained far beyond its capacity.
Low tariffs. Before June
1986, when it was increased to
GF 60/m 3 ($0.12/m 3), the water
$1.20  tariff was GF 10/m 3 ($0.02/m 3).
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Figure  2:  Price  of Water  before  Reform  costs, World Bank (1987,  p 19)
estimated  that  the  average
Source: World Bank Documents.  incremental cost of water (AIC)
was  about  US$0.25/m 3.
However, even this might have been somewhat low, given that in  1989, World Bank
(1989, p. 20) estimated that the AIC in Conakry was US$0.82/m 3.'7 Because of this, it
would have been difficult for even an efficient operator to operate and maintain the system
at the  tariff  levels in  place before reform.  Since, as  we  discuss below,  DEG  was
16  Similarly, Durany and Morel a  1'Huissier (1994) estimated that based on the number of household
connections SEEG reported that only about one-third of households should have had private connections in
1992,  compared to the 45% they observed.
'7  These estirates  should be treated with caution due both to the large differences in the estimates and to
the poor state of DEG's accounts. However, they indicate that prices  would have been too low to cover sector
expenses,  even if bill collection  had been reasonable.
8overstaffed, inefficient, and hopeless at billing and collection, there was very little money
available for either maintenance or system expansion.
Low labor productivity. By 1984, DEG had 504 employees,  a ratio of 34 employees
per 1000 connections (World Bank, 1987, p. 38).18 Even compared to other West African
public water utilities this was high - there were 32 and 24 employees per 1000 connections,
respectively,  in the public utilities in Togo and Benin. The private operator in Cote d'Ivoire,
SODECI, had only 9.8 employees per  1000 connections at this time (SODECI, 1986).
Further, Guinea's severe financial  problems led to a serious decline in civil service salaries,
including salaries at DEG, in the 1970s  and 1980s.  Because of this, DEG employees  had little
or no incentive  to do their job and many would show up at the office only to get their salary,
which was often  paid in cash.
Low billing and collection rates.  In principle, water distribution was metered and
consumers were charged according to consumption but, in fact, metering was very rare.
Despite a $12 million IDA loan in 1979, which included a component intended to increase
the number of connections and the extent of metering, only 5% of connections had  a
working meter in  1984.19  Very few private customers willingly paid for water and many
were not billed at all.  In 1989, nearly one quarter of connections were unregistered (see
footnote 15) and even fewer were actually billed - the 1985 consultant report estimated that
less than 12% of private users were billed in 1982. For the few customers that were billed,
the highly political nature of water prevented DEG from collecting. For example, in 1987,
DEG billed customers for approximately  GF 800 million, but collected only about GF 100
million (World Bank, 1989). Since the private billing and collection  rates were so low, DEG
relied upon infrequent payments and subsidies from the Government. However, even this
was unreliable,  and non-payment  by the government  often led to conflict  with donors. 2"
Troubled  financial  state.  Since DEG did not comply with international  accounting
standards, did not have audited accounts for most of the 1980s and maintained poor records
and data collection standards, it is very difficult to  assess DEG's  financial performance
before reform. 21 However, given that DEG maintained poor commercial habits and that
1  Between 1978 and 1984, DEG's workforce increased from 280 to 504 employees (World Bank, 1978,
p.65), mirroring similar growth in civil service employment.
19  In 1979, when the project was appraised, it was planned that 95% of connections would be metered by
1984.  The Project Completion Report noted "about  1000 connections were built but no meter could be
installed since those supplied under this project were diverted by persons unknown from their intended use"
(World Bank, 1987,  p. 6). In addition, the project had planned for 7350 new connections.
20 For example, in the late 1980s, the World  Bank waived provisions  for a structural  adjustment loan that
had required the administration  settle its water and electricity  bills promptly  (World  Bank, 1990a).
21  The 1985 consultants' report concluded that because of DEG's poor accounting  practices and the non-
availability  of most relevant data, and because DEG's budget was spread  between several different ministries, it
9tariffs were set below long run marginal cost, it is not surprising that DEG appears to have
had serious financial problems by the time of reform.  One indication of this is that, DEG
owed over US$4 million in unpaid interest and was over US$14 million in debt by 1984.
Another is that, even according to DEG's own accounts, it was losing large amounts of
money.  In 1988, DEG's total operating revenues (i.e., amount billed) were about GF 938
million ($2.6 million in 1996 dollars) and its total loss (i.e., retained earnings) was GF 805
million ($2.0 million in  1996 dollars).  This probably understates DEG's  actual losses,
since actual collections were significantly lower than billed water sales.
Poor service and water quality.  In addition to affecting the coverage rate, DEG's
troubled financial state had a large effect on water and service quality.  Although it is
difficult to find reliable data - DEG did not collect information on service interruptions,
water pressure or the time it took to repair breaks - by all accounts, water and service
quality were very poor.  Since water was often delivered through poorly maintained lead
pipes (sometimes to illegal connections) and was not isolated from the environment, it was
heavily polluted. 22 Consumers would have to run the water several minutes before it was
"clear" enough to appear drinkable.  Constant service interruptions meant that even the
lucky households with piped water had to  use polluted water from wells as secondary
source of drinking water.23  In addition, this meant that residents would have to store water
for long periods, often in unhygienic conditions (i.e., open buckets in an expanding city
with almost no existing sewerage system).
Unaccounted for  water (UFW).  Poor maintenance due, in part, to DEG's  weak
financial position, and the large number of illegal connection, also resulted in high levels
of unaccounted for water (UFW).  Although the lack of metering, and the more general
disarray of the sector, makes it difficult to estimate how high unaccounted-for-water was,
most estimates  were very high.  According  to the 1985 audit report, UJFW  was at least 60%
in 1983  - high compared to standards for well-developed systems (between 10 and 20%) or
to other water systems in West Africa (see Figure 10).24
was impossible to perform an audit. Similarly, in 1989, the World Bank (1989) concluded,  "the shortcomings
of DEG's accounting systems  are such that they largely preclude attempts  to observe trends and base forecasts"
(p. 19).
22  Most pipes were either only a few centimeters underground or, particularly for those installed after
1961,  above the ground.
2  In 1992, about 50% of people with access to piped water reported using well water as their primary
altemate source of drinking water when the system was not working (Durany and Morel a l'Huissier,  1994)
24 However, one year later, the World Bank (1987) estimated, more optimistically,  that UFW was 39%
and, in 1989,  World Bank (1989) estimated that UFW was about 35%.  Based upon the experience since the
private operator completed metering in 1995,  the higher estimates seem more likely.
10Alternate water sources.  In 1992, almost one-fifth of households reported that they
got piped water from a neighbor's connection. 25 Alternative sources, such as bottled water,
were almost nonexistent. Before reform, state control prevented  private initiatives to supply
water.  But even by 1993, nearly ten years after President Toure's death, less than 1% of
households purchased water  from  vendors  and  less  than  5%  purchased water  from
connected neighbors (Durany and Morel a l'Huissier, 1994, p. 20).  Many households used
rainwater for uses other than drinking (e.g., for washing dishes and bathing), especially
during the rainy season.  However, it was often stored in unsanitary conditions. Most non-
connected residents relied upon neighbors' connections or water from wells.  In 1992, 29%
of  Conakry residents relied  upon well water as  a  secondary their  primary source  of
drinking water and, as noted above, many others used it as a secondary source when the
system was not working.  Because the sewerage system was also undeveloped, well water
was heavily polluted. 26
Sewerage.  Although the sewerage system was (and remains) underdeveloped, it
has always been separate from the water supply system. 27 Consequently, the 1989 reforrn
did not have a significant effect on the sector, other than through its indirect effect on water
supply.  In 1992, 80% of households relied upon (and still rely upon) primitive sewerage
facilities in their courtyard.  21% of these facilities are simple unlined pits, 39% are pits
lined with cement, and 29% consist of two separate pits - rarely connected to a cesspit
(Durany and Morel a l'Huissier,  1994, p.19).  Sludge from these pits can leak into the
phreatic layer, from which households draw well water for daily activities such as washing
dishes and bathing, and can be close to leaking pipes that provide water to households and
public fountains.
25 Durany  and  Morel  a l'Huissier  (1994)  found  that 18%  of households  reported  that they  got their  water
from a neighbor's connection in  1992, including 5% that paid for it.  This survey was conducted before
extensive  metering.
26 Although data from the 1980s is not available,  it seems plausible that contamination of well water was
a serious problem at this time.  In 1994, a study of 57 modem and traditional wells found that, on average,
there were over 30,000 fecal coliforms/100 ml of well water (Gelinas et al.,  1994).  In comparison, the
bacteriological WHO (World Health Organization)  norm is zero fecal coliforms per 100ml of water and an
alternate  system classifies any  water with over  1000 fecal  coliforms/100 ml as  "seriously pathogenic"
(Feachem, 1980). The low connection  rate and increasingly common  breakdowns, therefore, posed a serious
health risk.
27  Durany and  Morel a  l'Huissier  (1994) found  that only about 5-10% of households had  latrines
connected to the sewerage system in 1992. This is broadly consistent with a study financed by Luxembourg
and Japan which estimated that only about 9% of Conakry residents were connected to sewerage (World
Bank, 1997a, p.4).
114.  Political Circumstance Leading to Reform
Given the weak institutional framework and the dire situation of the water system,
the reformn  ended up being quite radical, especially in a sector that is politically sensitive
and where full privatization is rare. Operational  control of the system was transferred from
a state-owned enterprise that was only nominally independent of the government ministry
it reported to, to a private-sector company that was owned, and controlled, by foreigners.
In addition, significant price increases were planned (over 500% in real terms over a five-
year period) and  even greater increases were implemented (over 600%).  Despite the
collapsing system, however, the govermment  took a long time to implement reform. Before
reform was finally enacted, six years passed and a change of government took place.  In
this section of the paper, we discuss why the reform occurred, why it took the form it did,
and why it took so long to enact.
4.1  Desirability of Reform
Although the crisis in the water sector made reform highly desirable, in many other
cases sector-specific crises have failed to motivate significant reform.  For example, over
the past decade, some parts of downtown Mexico City have sunk two meters due to the
overexploitation of  groundwater resources.  Despite this, the government implemented
only a minor reform, which 'failed to improve efficiency, reduce costs, raise revenue or
curb waste' (Haggarty, Brook, and Zuluaga, 1999, p. 52). Although problems in Conakry,
which were primarily the result of the poor performance of the public operator, were far
more tractable than the problems in Mexico City, poor performance alone has often failed
to motivate significant reform. 28
Theoretically, the government could reform the sector in many different ways:
however, its practical options were severely constrained.  The main problem was if sector
performnance  was to be improved additional funds would be needed to allow the operator to
cover its costs and to increase investment. The 1985 audit by SONEDE and Lyonnaise des
Eaux estimated that, at that time, US$73 million of investment was needed to increase
production capacity and repair and extend the distribution network.  Although, in theory,
these funds could be obtained in several different ways - for example, through additional
borrowing,  through  increased  subsidies  or  through  higher  tariffs  - in  practice,  the
government had only limited options.  Given that the government's  finances remained
weak at the time of reform, due to the disastrous economic  policies of the previous regime,
it was clear that the government could not  finance the needed investment without help
from donors.  However, the government's options were further constrained because the
28 See,  for example,  Walker  et al. (1999)  which  describes  reform  efforts  in the Honduran  water sector.
Further,  as noted earlier,  sector  performance  in Guinea  had  been  poor  for many  years  before  reforn.
12donors, led by the World Bank, demanded 'full cost recovery' (i.e. setting tariffs to cover
operating costs and support sector debt service) (Triche, 1990).  To get access to donor
funds, the government would therefore have to increase prices significantly. The focus on
cost recovery is  reflected in the contract signed between the private  operator and the
goverunent  ("contrat  d'exploitation"),  which  did  not  include  numerical  targets  for
increasing the  connection rate or  reducing UFW. 29 Even the World Bank-supported
Second Water Supply Project did not include plans for many new connections, especially
considering Conakry's fast growth (only 15,000 additional connections by 1994).
The need for  support from  donors and international organizations, due  to  the
pressure  that  the  macroeconomic  difficulties  put  on  public  finances,  limited  the
government's options in other ways.  Most importantly, the poor perforrnance of the First
Conakry Water Supply and Sanitation Project convinced the World Bank that significant
institutional reform, including some private sector participation, was necessary (World
Bank, 1987, p. 23).3° The government, therefore, found that it would have to accept some
form of private sector participation, if it were to receive aid.
Other  factors  also  encouraged private  sector participation.  The  government
recognized that reforming DEG without increasing private participation would have been
extremely difficult.  Even with technical assistance from abroad, entrenched interests and
existing corruption would make some tasks, notably bill collection, very difficult if DEG
remained in charge of the sector.  The decision to allow private sector participation also
reinforced the decision to allow the price to increase.  Since the government was (and
remains) delinquent in paying its utility bill, a private operator would have been wary
about relying on government subsidies, especially given the poor state of public finances
and the weak institutional environment.  Consistent with this observation, the part of the
price subsidy that went to the private operator for the first few years following reform was
funded through a World Bank loan, rather than from general government revenues.
An additional factor that  encouraged private sector participation is  that it was
consistent with the  governments' philosophy  of liberalization and privatization.  The
29 The contract  ("contrat  d'exploitation"),  formally  between  SONEG  operating  as a state agency  and
SEEG as the private operator, signed in April 1989,  does not mention any target on these issues, nor does the
annex  relative  to  the  creation  of  SEEG  or  the  list  of  requirements ("cahier  des  charges")  defining
responsibilities of the two organizations.  Only the "contract" ("contrat de plan") between the government
and SONEG, its own agency, defined targets with regard to connections  (from 16,400 in 1989 in Conakry to
20,200 in 1992). This did not commit the private operator and there is nothing about UFW in any of these
documents.
30 The World Bank's Project Completion  Report for this project concluded that 'the shortcomings of the
[sector] can be remedied most successfully  by a more commercial and entrepreneurial approach, preferably
by a degree of privatization" (Triche, 1990).
13structural  adjustment program  that  the  government implemented in  response  to  the
macroeconomic crisis greatly increased the private sector's role in the economy. 3 '  In this
respect, increased private participation in water was part of a larger program to increase the
importance of the private sector in the economy.
4.2  Feasibility of Reform
By restricting possible reform options, these constraints threatened the  feasibility of
reform.  Price increases and private sector participation would have a significant effect on
two powerful groups - the urban elite who were used to not paying' the full cost of water
and workers who might lose their jobs.  Reform would only be possible to the extent that
the government could either ignore these groups without threatening its support base or
compensate  them for their losses.
In practice, neither the urban elite nor public workers were vital supporters of the
new military government.  The clearest demonstration of this is that, in response to the
macroeconomic crisis,  the  government enacted a  structural  adjustment program  that
harmed  these  groups  significantly.  Within  days  of  assuming  power,  the  military
government  announced  that  it  intended  to  speed  up  the  liberalization  process  and
approached the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank to negotiate donor
aid. 32 The focus of the proposed reform package was improving the performance of the
agricultural sector, reducing the  size of  the public sector and  liberalizing prices  and
exchange rates. 33 The stress on agricultural production, which would initially benefit rural
areas,  was  a  marked  contrast  to  the  Toure  regime's  policy  of  favoring  its  urban
constituents. 34
3'  In 1986,  when  the government's  privatization  program  began,  there  were 131  state-owned  enterprises.
By  the end  of 1988,  20 had been  privatized  and 68  had been  liquidated  (World  Bank, 1990b,  p.20).
32 However,  formal  negotiations  with the IMF  did not begin for several  months. The new government
had arrested  an IMF  official  connected  to the Toure  regime  who  had been in Conakry  for President  Toure's
funeral  and  the IMF  refused  to negotiate  until  he had  been  released.
3  This was consistent  with the kinds of policies  that the IMF  and the World Bank were promoting  in
Africa  at that  time. See  World  Bank (1994a)  for a description  of structural  adjustment  in Africa  during  this
period  and Clapp  (1994)  for  a discussion  of Guinea's  structural  adjustment  program.
34  The government's  policy of promoting  agricultural  and rural development  was made clear to the
population. President  Conte  made  several  announcements  stressing  that  one of the regime's  main  goals was
to boost  agricultural  production.  In his 1985  New  Year speech,  he stressed  the importance  of the agricultural
sector  and  noted several  steps  that  could  be taken  to improve  performnance  (Clapp,  1996,  p. 62). On April 3,
1985,  in a speech  on the first anniversary  of the coup, President  Conte announced  that the main priorities
were boosting agricultural  performance  and improving  communications.  (Economist  Intelligence  Unit,
Second  Quarter  1995,  p.8).  This  is consistent  with documents  produced  for the 1987  Consultative  Group
Meeting with international donors that  notes that  improving agricultural production, through the
14The new government began initiating its agenda several months after coming to
power.  Prices were liberalized, the overvalued exchange rate was realigned, the state-
owned marketing boards and stores were closed and many state-owned enterprises were
privatized  or  liquidated.  Although  in  the  medium-term it  was  hoped  that  structural
adjustment would  benefit  all  Guineans, it  was  clear that  these reforms  would  cause
significant short-term pain  for many urban  residents.  Price increases for  agricultural
products  and the realignment of the overvalued exchange rate were expected to  benefit
agricultural producers, but would hurt urban workers used to subsidized prices for food and
imported goods.  This would be especially acute for higher-level officials who had better
access to goods at official prices - the same group who had access to free or low-cost
water. 35
The structural adjustment program, which resulted in a large number of layoffs,
also harmed public sector employees.  Employment in  state-owned enterprises fell from
17,111 in early 1986 to 2,000 by the end of 1989 and civil service employment fell from
70,989 in early 1986 to 51,000 by the end of  1990.36  These reductions were painful for
many Conakry residents, since despite the massive layoffs, 24% of employed workers (and
30%  of  employed  male  workers)  in  Conakry  worked  in  public  sector  in  1990
(Arulpragasam and  Sahn,  p.  123).  Considering that  public  sector  employment was
considerably larger in  1985, these job  losses were clearly painful, especially since the
poorly developed private sector was not to be able to quickly absorb laid-off workers. 37
In contrast, urban water reform would not have a large effect on the main groups
that the government relied upon for support.  The army, who were the most  important
supporters of the governnent,  would be  largely unaffected by  reform. 38 Further, rural
consumers, who were expected to be the main beneficiaries of structural adjustment, did
liberalization  of the sector,  was one of the key objectives  of the Economic  and Financial  Recovery  Program
(Republic  of Guinea,  1987).
3  Arulpragasam  and Sahn (1997,  p. 65) note, before structural  adjustment,  that over half of high-level
officials  in Conakry  purchased  their entire  rice  ration  at subsidized  official  prices. In contrast,  only 15%  of
low-level  officials  and 16%  of small-scale  merchants  could do this.
36 Data  from World  Bank (1990b,  p.21) and  De Merode  (1994,  p. 171).
37 Based  upon a survey  conducted  in 1990-91,  Mills and Sahn  (1997)  estimated  that nearly  half of laid-
off civil  servants  had  not found  a job (in either  the formal  or the informal  sectors)  after  four years.
38  Even  if the army  did not pay its water  bill, it would  take an extremely  brave private  operator  to agree
to cut water  off to army  barracks  or the Ministry  of Defense  in a weak institutional  environment.  In practice,
the army was largely  unaffected  by the entire structural  adjustment  program. In January 1985,  when the
government  took  the first  step  towards  reducing  civil  service  employment  by ordering  all civil  servants  older
than 55 or with more than 30 years of service to retire, it announced  that the army would no longer be
considered  part of the public sector. The reason for this was to shield it from any cuts in public  sector
employment  (EIU  Quarter  1 1985,  p15). In fact, the size of the army  had been increased  to 15,000  persons
by 1989  and soldiers  were awarded  a 15%  pay increase  at the time  of the announcement.
15not have access to piped water and, therefore, reform would mainly affect them through its
effect on government finances.
Although water sector reform would be painfuil for many DEG employees and
customers, it is important to note that some members of these groups would benefit from
reform. First, the government's, and DEG's, weak financial position meant that employees
could often not rely upon receiving wages in a timely manner.  The DEG employees who
found jobs in the new private enterprise might therefore benefit from reform.  Similarly,
although current DEG customers would have to pay  (considerably) higher prices, they
would benefit  from improved service and water  quality.  Consequently, not  all DEG
employees and current customers could be counted as potential losers.
The government also took steps to reduce opposition from current DEG customers
and employees.  First, the government, with  support from the World Bank,  agreed to
subsidize  prices  during  the  early  years  of  reform.  Although  price  increases  were
implemented immediately, they were far smaller than would be  needed to  cover sector
costs.  Second,  the Government, again with  World Bank  support, compensated DEG
employees who were not selected for jobs at SEEG or SONEG. 39 Of 504 DEG employees,
40 were hired by SONEG, 250 by SEEG, and 30 qualified for other civil service positions
(Triche, 1990, p. 16). Additional persons retired or moved to other  jobs in the formal sector.
Remaining employees were offered basic equipment and special training, organized and
monitored  by  the  Compagnie Generale  des  Eaux,  to  help  them  create  and  develop
cooperatives specializing in public works. 40 Notwithstanding severe tension, this made
reform acceptable  to most employees. 4'
4.3  Contractual Options
Within the general framework  of increased prices and private sector participation, the
government had several options.  The March 1985 consultant report considered possibilities
ranging from a  management contract to  full privatization.  In the  end, the government
39 The selection  process  was through  a series  of objective  tests  (initially  managed  by the World  Bank)  that
were  "supplemented"  with  recommendations  from former  managers  at DEG. The subjective  evaluations  raised
serious  concerns  about objectivity.  The same  procedure  was used to decide on civil services  layoffs in the
broader  program  of job cuts.
40 It seems  that  there  were strong  pressures  from  the concerned  ministries  to have one single cooperative
grouping  all former  employees.  It is not clear why. One explanation  proposed  by a former  employee  is that
the government  wanted  to minimize  the equipment  to be provided  to laid-off  workers.
41  However,  results  have proven to be more ambiguous  than was originally  hoped.  Only 87 former
employees  took advantage  of the initial  training. Eight years later, only two very small cooperatives  are
operational. Both SONEG  and SEEG  are unionized  (CNTG  at SONEG;  USTG and ONSLG at SEEG),
although  unions  do not seem  to have much  influence.
16decided on a mixed scheme with a public enterprise owning and developing infrastructure
and a mixed company, dominated  by the private sector, in charge of operating the system. It
chose this, rather than full privatization for several reasons.  First, it was thought that
private enterprises might not be willing to invest in the development of infrastructure.
Although the current government was committed to reform, the political  situation was
unstable: several coups had been attempted and civil unrest was pressuring the government
to become more democratic.  Further, although Guinea was (and still is) trying to increase
the competence and independence  of the judiciary, the judiciary was (and remains) weak and
heavily dependent upon the executive. 42 Because of this, and because of the weak system of
property rights, the judiciary had a very poor record of enforcing private contracts. 43 Under
these circumstances, investment in long-lived and non-transferable assets was thought too
risky  for many private  firms.  Finally,  foreign ownership of  assets would  have been
controversial and might have led to greater unrest.  For these reasons, the government
adopted a scheme that would involve little private investment.
4.4  The Long Delay before the Reform Was Enacted
Although radical reform eventually occurred, it was not implemented until six years
after the initial studies and five years after the change in government.  Overall, it is not
surprising that the Toure regime did not implement significant reform. Unlike the military
government that replaced it, the Toure regime was highly dependent upon the two groups
that would be harmed by reform (see Section 11.1). Any reform that resulted in increased
prices, especially of the magnitude actually implemented, and layoffs would harm the
regime's main support base and, therefore, would have been hardly feasible.
In contrast, the five-year lag following the change of government reflects the slow
pace of structural adjustment and, more generally, political instability in the early years of
the new regime.  A major coup attempt less than a year after President Conte came to
power showed that the new government could not entirely ignore the welfare of Conakry
residents.'  Following the attempt, the Economist Intelligence Unit  noted (3'  Quarter
1985, p12):
"At the same time, however, [President Conte and his colleagues] are well aware
that much of the population of Conakry, which proved loyal to the government at
42  The  Government  is currently  developing  a new system  of institutions,  laws  protecting  rights  and  contract
laws,  largely  inspired  by the French  system  and  it intends  to put an administration  in place  to fully  implement
these  laws. However,  even  now,  the system  is mainly  theoretical  and  largely  incomplete.
4  A 1996  bill, approved  by the Government,  that  would  have  allowed  SEEG  to sue consumers  who  do not
pay their bill, was rejected  by Parliament. This  might  not be surprising  since,  in interviews,  several  sources
noted  that  it is thought  that  most deputies  do  not pay  their  utility  bills.
4This also  made  the government  aware  that it could  not take  the support  of the army  for granted.
17the time of the coup (or at least resistant to the blandishments of Traor6), will suffer
a drop in living standards as a result of the key reforns being proposed."
Consequently,  sensitive  reforms  that  would  harm  urban  residents,  such  as
realigning the exchange rate and civil service employment reductions, were approached
cautiously. 45 After years of repression and shifting policies under the Toure regime, it was
going to take some time for adjustment to result in increased agricultural production and
improved welfare in rural areas. Since President Toure was very careful about making sure
that rivals could not build effective power bases while he remained president, the new
military leaders were unable to build support before taking power.  Consequently, while
the new leaders were forging a coalition, they remained heavily reliant on the military and
on  general goodwill conferred to  them  for  ending President Toure's  more repressive
policies.  Since the benefits  of structural adjustment would take a  reasonable time  to
materialize, it is not surprising that the new government was careful about implementing
reforms, including water reform, that could initiate protests.
5.  Contract Design and Implementation of Reform
Water reform was finally adopted in 1989. World Bank requirements  meant that the
private partner had to be selected through international bidding.  Six companies initially
expressed interest: SONEDE (Tunisia),  TEAME (UK), Lyonnaise des Eaux (France), SAUR
(France), SAGER and  Compagnie Generale des Eaux (re-named VIVENDI, also  from
France).  Two of  the bidders  dropped out during the process and  the  four remaining
companies combined to form two competing consortia. A joint venture led by SAUR, with
the participation  of Compagnie Generale des Eaux, submitted the lower bid, which was 30%
below  the consultant evaluation.  SAUIR  quickly confirmed its  leadership in  the newly
formed company with the help of  experts from Cote d'lvoire,  where SAUR had  been
successfully  involved in the water sector for nearly 30 years (see Menard and Clarke, 2000).
New contracts were formally signed in 1989 and were supported by the World Bank
coordinated Second Water Supply Project.  This $102.6 million project included a $40
million loan from the World Bank on concessional IDA terms, a $23 million loan from the
African Development  Bank, and $8.6 million from the Government of Guinea and SONEG. 46
4  For example,  the exchange  rate was not realigned  until January 1986;  public  sector retrenchment  did
not begin in earnest  until  the same  time;  and the consumer  price for rice  was not fully  liberalized  until 1987.
Clapp (1996, p. 62) notes "[President]  Conte's desire to keep both urban dwellers and farmers content
ultimately  delayed  the adoption  of a coherent  reform  program'.
46 The original  estimate  of the cost  of the project  was US $102.6  million  (World  Bank, 1989). However,
the Japanese  government  later  added an additional  US $5.6 million. (World  Bank, 1997a). Changes  in the
SDR-US$  exchange rate meant that actual expenditures  were US $105.6 million.  In practice, the
contribution  of the individual  partners  varied  slightly  from the original  estimates  (See World Bank, 1997a,
18The project originally included $57.9 million for expansion of the Conakry water supply
system and $4.1 million for rehabilitation  of existing facilities. 47
5.1  Sector Organization Following Reform.
As part of the reform, two enlterprises  were created: Societe Nationale des Eaux de
Guinee (SONEG) and Soci6te d'Exploitation des Eaux de Guinee (SEEG).  The reform
involved a set of three contracts:  one between the Government  and SONEG ("Contrat plan");
one  between SONEG and SEEG (the lease contract), and  one between  SEEG and  its
international shareholders  (a "Technical assistance"  contract). In addition, there are contracts
between SEEG and its customers, i.e., users of the water system.  Although we will discuss
all contracts, we focus our attention on the lease contract  between SEEG and SONEG, which
introduced private participation  into the sector.
p.  18 for final estimates).  The World Bank loan, from the International Development Agency (IDA), was on
standard IDA terms (50 years at a 0.75% interest rate).
47 Actual expenditures on these components were considerably higher - $84.9 million on expansion and
$9.0 million on rehabilitation (World Bank, 1997a,  p.17).
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Figure  3: Institutional  Arrangement  in Guinea
Twofirms involved. Figure 3 shows sector organization and the pattern of ownership
of the two enterprises, SONEG and SEEG.  SONEG is a small (44 employees in  1997),
entirely state owned government agency, which reports to a board of directors and to the
Ministry of Natural Resources and Energy. Formally, the relationship between SONEG and
the government is monitored through a contract, the "contrat plan".  At the time of reform,
that contract defined rules governing the determination  of tariffs (see below), and committed
the government to pay its bill regularly.  It was also the only contract that defined specific
targets, namely, the increase of connections, from an estimated 16,400 in 1989 to 20,200 in
1992.
20The lease contract defines the responsibilities  of SONEG and SEEG. SONEG owns
sector assets and is responsible for planning, projecting and managing infrastructure,  sector
accounting, managing funds from the 'rental fee' and donors to pay for new investment and
service sector debt. Since its expenses are covered by the "rental fees" paid to it by SEEG,
fonnally, it is financially  independent  (i.e., SEEG pays SONEG  a percentage  of collections  to
cover SONEG's operating costs, finance investment  and service debt). It is also responsible
for supervising most large-scale investment  (e.g., reservoirs and transmission  pipelines) and
for the construction and maintenance of the primary distribution network (i.e., pipes more
than 160 mm in diameter).  One significant restriction, however, is that SONEG cannot
finance investment  through borrowing;  this is the responsibility  of the government. Although
SONEG is formally an independent agency, its board is under direct Government control,
with members appointed  by different  ministries. 48 Its staff, including  its Directeur Gen6ral,  is
also appointed by the government.  Political incentives, therefore, tends to  prevail over
economic ones.  SONEG is  further constrained by  its  reliance upon foreign suppliers
(including SAUR,  the leading shareholder  in SEEG) for many of its needs.
SEEG, which is 49% state-owned and 51% privately owned, has a ten-year lease
contract  with SONEG. SEEG is in charge  of the distribution  and commercialization  of water,
including building and maintaining the secondary and tertiary distribution networks (i.e.,
pipes under 160mm  in diameter); metering,  billing and collecting;  and paying the rental fee to
SONEG.  As we noted above, the private owners are two French companies, SAUR (a
subsidiary of Groupe BOUYGUES, a French company heavily involved in public works),
which has the leadership in this arrangement,  and Compagnie  Generale des Eaux (CGE, now
Vivendi).  In addition to the lease contract, the two French partners signed a "technical
assistance contract" with  SEEG to provide managerial support, technical assistance and
financial expertise, and to help train Guinean personnel. 49 As their contribution to SEEG,
SAUR and CGE provided 51% of the initial US $3 million of capital.  For its contribution,
the Government  donated equipment  and infrastructure  from DEG and, through SONEG, took
responsibility  for accumulated  sector  debt.
Overlapping responsibilities.  Notwithstanding the presence of  five government-
appointed representatives  on its eleven member Board, SEEG appears, for the most part, to
act like a private company. The private owners are responsible  for nominating the General
Manager, while the government is responsible for choosing the Chairman of the Board.
4  At time of reform, in 1989, the 11 members of the Board were appointed by 10 different ministries.
4  This contract  between  SEEG  and the foreign  owners  specified  conditions  under which  the foreign
companies  provided  home-office  support  for day-to-day  management  problems,  selection  of expatriate  staff
and audits of procedures.  Remuneration was set at 2% of SEEG's revenues (World Bank, 1989, p. 9).  The
contract  is protected  by a confidentiality  clause  for five years  after  the end  of the contract,  which  was  for two
years but renewable (and it has actually been renewed).
21Several factors increase SEEG's autonomy from government pressure.  First, the foreign
management's  close  ties  to  SEEG's  international  owners  significantly  reduce  the
Government's influence.  In addition, the contractual arrangement, which puts SEEG in
charge of bill collection, gives SEEG direct control over the financial resources it needs to
operate.
The division of investment responsibilities between the two agencies has led to
significant  problems,  with  the  two  agencies  blaming  each  other  for  delays  and
disagreements.  The different priorities and constraints that the two agencies face are part
of the problem.  Because SONEG tends to be more concerned with social and political
goals, while SEEG has commercial goals, they often disagree on priorities concerning
network expansion. Further, SONEG, as a public agency, has to follow public procedures
when  making  investments,  for example, awarding large  investment contracts  through
bidding.  SONEG's processes are often slow and costly, and provide opportunities for
public interference, corruption, and delay.  In contrast, SEEG, as a private company, has
much  greater  flexibility  and,  consequently,  SEEG  tries  to  go  over  SONEG's  head,
developing infrastructure beyond its  contractual responsibilities.  Although the contract
explicitly prohibits SEEG from doing this, once it is done, the situation is irreversible. For
example, when the Caisse Francaise de Developpement provided SEEG with substantial
aid to develop new infrastructure (without bidding and ignoring the clause that makes
SONEG responsible for such projects), there was very  little that  SONEG could do.
Further, despite SEEG's role in investment,  SEEG assumes almost no investment-related  risk
- loans for infrastructure  are the responsibility of the Government.
Institutional impediments.  Implementation of the contract between SONEG and
SEEG has been made more difficult by low administrative  capability and the absence of an
independent  judiciary. This has meant that there is no impartial body that is able to constrain
arbitrary action by the government and credibly enforce contracts provisions. For example,
recognizing that SEEG could apply pressure to SONEG by refusing to pass SONEG the
rental fee, provisions in the contract allow SONEG to seize a deposit paid by SEEG if this
occurs.  However,  implementation  of this  clause has  been  difficult due  to  political
interference by the government.  For example, in  1991, when the government stopped
paying a large part of its water bill (see Figure 6), SEEG, which still had to pay workers
and suppliers, found itself in a  difficult financial position.  In response, SEEG stopped
passing SONEG the rental fee on the money it was collecting from the private sector,
formally a breach of contract.  This, in  turn, imposed a significant burden  on SONEG,
threatening its capacity to pay employees, reimburse international  lenders and continue with
investment. However, when SONEG threatened to impose the penalty, SEEG, backed by
its international owners, argued that the delay was due to non-payment by the government
and government representatives forced SONEG to back down.  Ultimately, under pressure
from international donors who made settlement a condition for credit effectiveness for the
22Third Water Supply and Sanitation Project, SEEG and SONEG significantly reduced their
cross-debts  on September 26, 1996.50
This  episode demonstrates that  contract provisions designed to  prevent  certain
government action will not be useful, unless there is an independent  body that can enforce the
contract and prevent the government from taking retaliatory action.  Although the lease
contract explicitly allowed SEEG to cut water to government entities that were more than
four months late with payments, SEEG was unwilling to  actually cut off water to any
agencies of the Central Government. In part, SEEG's unwillingness reflected its concerns
about its relationship with the government, since the central government has significant
power over SEEG in many ways. 51 For example, at that time, SEEG was trying to get the
government to pass a law that would allow it to force collection for non-payment by private
parties and to approve price increases larger than had been originally planned.  In addition,
SEEG's decision not to cut off agencies of the central government might reflect the direct
influence  the Government has over SEEG through its representation  on SEEG's board.
Dispute resolution.  Another effect that weak institutions have on outcomes is the
apparent failure of several mechanisms directed at dispute resolution. First, the govermment,
which owns 49% of SEEG, has representatives  on the boards of both SEEG and SONEG. It
was hoped that this would improve coordination  between the two enterprises. In fact, it did
the opposite by introducing ambiguity about whether the contract was open to repeated re-
negotiation, rather than being a  final firm contract between the two parties.  Second, the
arrangement allowed the two parties to appeal to the judiciary in Guinea and, ultimately  to an
international institution, the Centre International  pour le Reglement des Diffierends  Relatifs
aux Investissements (CIRDI), in cases of major dispute. The clause was intended to reassure
foreign  investors  concerned  about  the  lack  of  institutional  constraints  on  arbitrary
government action (e.g., the weak judiciary).  In practice, however, this clause is almost
purely symbolic. It is not possible to solve everyday disputes and disagreements  through an
international  forum and, since turning to international  arbitration  would suggest major failure
to  foreign investors and international organizations, it is difficult to use  for even major
disputes. Further, in the absence of an independent  judiciary, it is unclear how CIRDI could
force the govemment  to comply with it decisions, if it ruled against it.
50 Before September 1996, cross debts were about GF  4 billion. This was reduced to GF 660 million that
the government owes to SEEG and GF  608 million that SEEG owes to SONEG. To a large degree, since SEEG
was owed money  by the  government and  owed money to  SONEG, a  government agency, this  was an
accounting exercise, with the result that the government was re-paying SONEG, a public agency.  Once the
World Bank approved the Third Water Supply and Sanitation Project,  cross-debts  began to accumulate  again.
51  In  contrast,  SEEG  has  been  willing  to  cut  water  to  local  government  agencies,  which  have
significantly less power over SEEG (e.g., local agencies play no part in price reviews).
23In practice, therefore, problems are largely  solved though  informal negotiations
between top  managers - making the  persons in  charge crucial - or  through political
interference  (e.g., when SONEG tried to impose the penalty for not paying it the rental fee).
Political interference, however, is costly.  First, it introduces many biases and can result in
delayed, and  unpredictable, outcomes.  Second, as  noted above, these  problems have
poisoned relations between  SEEG and  SONEG, making it  more  difficult for the  two
companies to work together. 52
5.2  Regulation: Some Major Inefficiencies
Clearly,  water  reform  is  more  likely  to  succeed if  an  efficient  and  credible
regulatory  entity  is  developed, with  the  capacity to  force the partners to  fulfill  their
commitments.  This  has  not happened in  Guinea.  In  the absence of  an  independent
regulator, the efficient running of the system depends on the set of contracts and their
implementation.  As we have shown, the arrangement is plagued with several problems.
SONEG, who is officially responsible for monitoring SEEG, does not appear able to do
this due both to its lack of autonomy and to information asymmetries  between SONEG and
SEEG.  SONEG's lack of autonomy means that major decisions and conflicts go to the
cabinet of the Ministry of Natural Resources and even to the President of the Republic.
Consequently, the government  has  significant discretionary power  that  is  only  partly
counterbalanced by the influence of international lenders and the efficient lobbying of the
powerful international companies that own SEEG.
This discretionary  power can create uncertainty for SEEG, since SONEG's plans and
their implementation depend upon political decisions made by  the government.  Since
SONEG plans, contracts, and monitors the development of the primary network, SEEG has
to rely upon SONEG to do this before it can develop the secondary network.  This creates
two sources of risk for SEEG.  First, there is the risk that the  government will divert
SONEG's rental fee to fund other, non-sector  related, spending. This could mean that needed
investment in the primary network is not performed. Second, there is uncertainty related to
the bureaucratic process that approves SONEG's investment program. The government can
use bureaucratic delays to improve its bargaining position or disguise other motives.  This
encourages SEEG to make investments that should be made by SONEG (e.g., in the primary
network) and to skirt rules (e.g., by splitting large investment  into several small parts to avoid
public control).
However, in the presence of weak regulation, information  asymmetries can also work
in SEEG's favor.  For example, since the distribution network includes some lead pipes
installed in the 1950's and some newly installed PCV pipes, maintenance costs are difficult to
52 Relations  did improve after SEEG's management was replaced in 1997.
24observe.  Since SEEG  is responsible for maintaining the  secondary network, it  could
potentially overstate these costs.  This is made easier because most maintenance inputs are
imported. An additional problem is that SEEG can also bid on constructions contracts. Since
it does not produce separate accounts for its separate functions (e.g., those that should be
regulated and those that are not), it is difficult  to assess the profitability of the lease contract. 53
These informational asymmetries have been  aggravated by  SEEG's  refusal to  provide
SONEG with the reports and information,  including the separate accounts,  which the contract
requires.
5.3  Prices
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including the local currency operating costs of SONEG.  However, the foreign currency
costs (e.g., for imported equipment and supplies) were covered by proceeds from a World
Bank loan and the governnent  continued to service part of sector debt. 54 These subsidies
slowly declined until 1995, by which time the consumer tariff was supposed to cover all
costs (see Figure  4). It was thought that this would imply an average price to consumers of
5  For example, in the U.K.,  the private water utilities produce separate accounts for regulated  and
unregulated businesses
5  The World Bank contributed  US $16.9 million to subsidize the scheme.  The subsidy was described as
'support for the rehabilitation of sector operations' in World Bank documents and was designed as support
for the institutional building that was needed to implement the lease contract. The original appraisal was for
$15.4 million, but the final sum ended up being somewhat higher (World Bank, 1998a, p 17).
25660 FG/m 3 in 1995,  which would fall to 566 FG/m 3 in 1998 (Triche, 1990).  In practice, prices
have been considerably  higher.
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Figure 5: Actual and Projected Prices in Guinea  while allowing consumers to  share
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Source:  SONEG  (Actual) and World Bank (1989)  term.  Although there was initially
(Projected)_____________________________  I__ some  concern  that  the  government
would not increase tariffs enough to  "ensure sound sector development" (World Bank,
1989, p. 30), this has not been a problem in practice.  In fact, prices have been allowed to
increase far more quickly than originally planned.  By 1996, the average tariff had reached
880 FG/m 3, compared to an expected price of GNF 660/m 3. The difference between actual
and projected  tariffs was not the result of higher than anticipated  inflation. Figure 5 shows
that the price has grew faster in real terms than originally  projected. 56
At the end of 1997, the minimum bimonthly payment for service was 13500 FG
(about US$13).  This fixed payment included payment for the first 20 cubic meters of water
and has to be paid in fuill  whether the household consumed the whole 20 m 3 or not. 57 The
price of water between 20 and 60 cubic meters was 850 FG/m 3 and the price above 60 cubic
meters was 925 FG/m 3. In addition, it costs 90,000 FG (about US$90 in  1996) to be
connected to the system.  Given that the average income of a high public servant was only
about 150,000  FG (about  USS150 in 1996) a month, these amounts are quite substantial. In
field interviews, even relatively wealthy persons claimed that the high prices make it almost
impossible for them to afford connections,  especially  because of the deeply embedded social
5  A clause of the lease contract also opens the possibility of renegotiation if there are "significant"
variations in taxes and "redevances", i.e., when government decisions significantly affects tariffs.
56 Projected price is deflated by 1988 forecasts of the CPI from World Bank files and the actual price is
deflated by the actual  CPI.
5  A similar pricing scheme is used in Cote d'Ivoire.  The price schedule is flatter in Guinea, so that
tariffs for small  consumers, mostly low-income households, are significantly higher.
26custom of providing free water to family and neighbors.  Possible reasons for the high price
are discussed in the next section.
6.  Effect  of Reform  on Sector  Performance.
Despite the problems with conflict resolution and overlapping responsibilities, there
is no doubt that reform resulted in  a significant improvement in  sector performance.
However, given the disastrous performance before reform, the results have not been as
dramatic as was originally hoped and significant scope for future improvement remains. In
this section, we analyze the mixed results and suggest some explanations.
6.1  Improved  Performance  along Many Dimensions
Increased investment.  Although it was hoped that the sector could become self-
supporting in  the medium term through increases in  tariffs, funds for  investment and
rehabilitation were needed immediately.  Consequently, international donors, led by the
World Bank, agreed to finance a large investment  project), the Second  Water Supply Project.
The project had four main investment  components.
i.  US  $4 million to  support SONEG, including technical assistance, consultants,
training and equipment.
ii.  US $4 million to rehabilitate  existing facilities.
iii.  US $1 million to provide consultants' service for studies of secondary centers and
to design a training program for staff laid-off from DEG.
iv.  US $58 million to expand the Conakry water system, including increasing the
capacity of the pipeline between Grandes Chutes and Conakry, the addition of a
new treatment plant and extension of the distribution network (including 15,000
new connections). 8
The new  pipeline  from  Grande  Chutes dramatically increased  potential water
production, from 54,000 m3/day in  1988 to  100,000 m3/day by the end of  1993 (World
Bank, 1998a).  Actual production has been far lower that this - average daily production
was 60,345 m3/day in Conakry in 1996.  However, even this reflects the extremely high
5S An addition US $21 million was included for contingencies  (Word Bank, 1989).
27rate of UFW, since average billed consumption was only 30,255 m 3/day. 59 Consequently, if
SEEG and SONEG could reduce the rate of UFW to around 20% (i.e., the rate in Abidjan),
current productive capacity should adequately service needs in the near-term, even if the
number of connections increases significantly.
Increased connection rate.  Although the number of (legal) connections increased
after the lease was implemented, the increase was slower than anticipated and coverage
remains low.i 0 By 1997, there were about 31,000 connections in Guinea, including about
25,000 connections in Conakry (population of about 1.7 million). 6"  In comparison, there
were close to 180,000 connections for 2.7 million inhabitants in Abidjan, Cote d'Ivoire
(SODECI, 1996).  The low connection rate reflects economic, technical and institutional
factors.  First, as discussed in detail below, many residents cannot (or will not) pay for
water due its high price.  In 1994, it was estimated that nearly 12,000 connections were
inactive due to non-payment (Brook Cowen, 1996).  Since the private collection rate was
still around 60% in mid-1997, meaning connections will continue to be cut-off, and the
price remains high preventing the reactivation of inactive connections, this  number is
probably  still  quite  high.  Second, Conakry's  chaotic, unplanned  and  out-of-control
development, which has been aggravated by the large and sudden inflow of refugees from
civil  wars in  neighboring Liberia and Sierra Leone, has made expanding the network
technically difficult. 62 Finally, disagreements between SEEG and SONEG, which  are
responsible for complimentary  portions of investment, also slowed system expansion.
'  Average  daily  production  and billing  do not vary greatly  over the year - in 1996,  the maximum
average  daily  production  and billed  consumption  for any two-month  period  was 61,693  mn 3 (April-May)  and
31,962  m 3(June-July).
60 Under  the Second  Water  Supply  Project,  15,000  connections  were planned  (nationwide)  by 1995. By
rnid-  1997,  only 11,000  of these  connections  had  actually  been  implemented.
61 According  to data from SEEG,  there  were about  25,000  private  connections  in Conakry  at the end of
1997,  compared  to 13,300  in 1989. In addition,  there were about 130 standpipes  in 1997  - there were 40
operational  standpipes  in 1989  (World  Bank, 1989,  p.3), 35 new standpipes  were built between 1989 and
1996  and 55 standpipes  rehabilitated  by 1996  (World  Bank, 1998a,  p.25).  According  to a UNDP-World
Bank survey from 1992,  approximately  27 people  used each connection  including  family,  neighbors,  etc.
(Durany  and Morel  a l'Huissier,  1994,  p.19).  This  might  overestimate  the number  of people with  access  to
piped water  - the technical  director  of SONEG  suggested  that  only  about 15  persons  used each connection  in
1997. One plausible  reason  for the difference  is that the UNDP survey was completed  before metering
became  common,  and metering  might have reduced  supply of free water to neighbors. Using the higher
number (27 people per connection),  an estimate  of 1000 people per standpipe  based upon the average
number  of people  per standpipe  in 1992  (Durany  and Morel  a l'Huissier,  1994)  and population  figures  from
United  Nations  (1996),  the coverage  rate was 48% in 1997.  Preliminary  evidence  suggests  that growth  of
connections  accelerated  in 1998. Number of connections  from data provided  by SEEG  and population
estimate  from United  Nations  (1996).
62 Although  serious  effort was made  in the 1980's  to organize  the development  of new districts,  these
seem  to have  been  abandoned.
28Increased  number  of  standpipes.  Although  the  number  of  standpipes  has
increased, they remain uncommon - there were about 130 standpipes in Conakry in 1997,
although  not  all  were  active.  This  translates to  9,050  non-connected residents  per
standpipe. 63 During field interviews, SEEG officials stated that SEEG does not want to
manage standpipes, arguing that the widespread belief that water from standpipes should
be  free damages their relations with  users if  the company tries  to charge  for usage.
Consequently, although SEEG installs standpipes when asked by a Commune (municipal
government), it does not manage them.  Instead, the Commune and SEEG jointly select a
manager, who collects user charges that he pays to SEEG.  SEEG then returns a share of
this money to the Commune to cover access charges and employee benefits.  In practice,
managers  are often  unable  to  resist  pressure  for  free water  from  neighbors  and  are
sometimes corrupt.  Consequently, they end up collecting little money from users, leaving
the municipal government to foot the bill.  If the commune does not pay, SEEG can, and
does, cut the standpipes off.
The low connection rate means that water-related health problems remain a major
issue due  to  the  large number of  customers who  consume unsafe  water  from  illegal
connections and contaminated wells.  These difficulties are confirmed by data on sickness
traditionally related to unsafe water and inadequate sewerage,  particularly those of group 1,
which remain the main source of mortality (in decreasing order: malaria, diarrhea, hepatitis
A, poliomyelitis, and skin diseases).i' Gelinas et al. (1996) suggest that the use of piped
water, rather than well water, would reduce the incidence of  water-borne diseases (p.
2017).
Improved water and service quality.  Although it is difficult to find data, almost
everyone agreed that the water and service quality improved dramatically following reform.
For example, the manager at the local Coca-Cola bottler noted that while the water was
muddy and discolored until several years after the reform, regular tests confirm that it now
meets the  standards imposed by their international headquarters.  The  Organization  for
Consumer Protection in Conakry rates water quality as excellent and notes that it can be
consumed as delivered (World Bank, 1998a,  p.31).  Similarly,  a 1994 study, which measured
chemical and bacteriological contamination  in piped and well water in Conakry, concluded
that piped water "was found to comply with WHO norms for drinking water" (Gelinas et al.
1996, p. 2017).
63 In comparison,  the rate is about 1,650 non-connected  residents  per standpipe in Abidjan, CMte
d'Ivoire.
6  For example,  a cholera  epidemic  in 1994  resulted  in 675 deaths,  including  330 in Conakry  (World
Bank, 1997a).
29The reform has also resulted in improved customer service.  To make it easier to
complain, apply for new connections,  notify SEEG about needed repairs and pay bills, SEEG
divided  Conakry  into  three  districts, each  with  its  own  director.  Conakry's  poor
infrastructure, heavy traffic  and  appalling public  transportation makes  this  especially
valuable.  SEEG also took steps to make it easier to respond to breaks and perform needed
repairs.  For example, SEEG invested in light equipment (e.g., motorcycles) so that they
could collect bills more efficiently and respond more quickly to repair requests.  SEEG's
detailed computerized map of the network and  final connections (excessively detailed
according to some experts who consider the system overdeveloped and over-subsidized)
make it easier to locate disruptions.  Delays for new connections are reasonable, although
consumers complain about SEEG's policy of waiting until a large group of consumers pay
deposits before expanding the network.  Similarly, although some individuals complain
about delays getting repairs done, most agree that this is not a major problem.
Rapid metering.  Following reform, SEEG rapidly metered households, businesses,
and the administration. Before reform, despite metering projects funded by the World Bank
and other international donors, only about 5% of customers  had working meters.  By 1996,
98% of private customers were metered and  100% of administration connections were
metered.
One effect of metering was to reduce the amount of water billed to the government.
Before metering, in  1990 (the first full year of private operation), estimated government
consumption was close  to  7.5  million m 3 of  water.  In  1996, measured government
consumption was  about 3.6  million ni 3. Most of  the  decline was probably  because
government consumption was overestimated  before metering and because responsibility for
consumption from standpipes was transferred from the central, to municipal, governments. 65
However, it  appears that  the government consumption continued to  decline even after
metering  was  complete  in  1995,  suggesting  that  the  government  is  reducing  its
consumption.66  Before 1989, billing was centralized  by the government and, therefore, there
was little incentive for any individual agency within the government to use water efficiently
(even if metered). This changed following  the reform and now each agency is responsible for
its own water bill.  Although this gives individual agencies an incentive to take steps to use
water more sparingly (e.g., reporting breaks and leaks more quickly), non-payment weakens
incentives.
65 For the first few years following  reform,  the central government  was responsible  for running and
paying  for consumption  from standpipes  and  water from  standpipes  was free.
66  86% of public consumption  was metered in 1984 and 100%  was metered in 1995.  Government
consumption  declined  from 4,771,000  m 3 in 1995  to 3,551,000  m3 in 1996.
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Figure  6: Collection  Rate  (as  %  of Amount  Billed)  increased, the collection  rate  fell -
from  75% of the  amount  billed  in
Note:  The collection  rate can exceed 100%  if unpaid bills  1989-90  to  under  50%  in  1991-
from previous  years  are paid in current  year.
Source:  SEEG.  1992.  It  recovered  in  1993  and
remained  at  around  60%  through
1996 (See Figure  6).  SEEG can, and does, cut off customers who  do not pay their bills  for
three consecutive  months. 67 SEEG also discontinued  the practice of allowing high-level  civil
servants  and deputies  to have  unbilled  connections  (although  this does not mean  that they
actually pay their bills!)
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Figure 7:NEG  Indicators of  Labor Prodctivityfor  SEEG  connections  per  employees  failed
and SONEG  to  increase  significantly  and
Note:  The number of  employees includes employees of  actually  dropped  between  1994
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67  Field interviews  with households, businesses and local administrations  confirm that SEEG does do this
consistently,  although its implementation  may raise sporadic  protests.
31number of connections that year (23,435 in 1996 compared to about 31,000 in 1997). The
second measure of productivity is output per employee.  This  measure also increased
imnmediately  following reform, due to the large reduction in labor force, then declined,
although at a slower pace, after 1993  68
Total  factor  productivity
0.7  also  increased  at  the  time  of
0.6  reform. However, since this time,
0.5  TFP  has  also  slowly  declined
0.4  (although it remains considerably
0.3
0.2 - higher than before reforrn).  The
0.1  most  noticeable decline was  the
87  88  89  90  91  92  93  94  95  96  large drop in 1993.  This is due to
the large increase in fixed capital
Figure 8: Total Factor Productivity  for SEEG and  due  to  investment in  production
SONEG  facilities.  Since  a  large  part  of
productive  capacity  remained
Note: Measures  of TFP  include  inputs  from  both  SEEG  and  unused by the end of 1997, due to
SONEG.  the  slow  development  of  the
distribution  network,  total  factor
productivity should increase as the distribution network expands.
Improvedfinancial  situation.  Given the  improvements  in billing,  collection  and
productivity and the large increases in tariffs, it is not surprising that the sector's financial
situation improved dramatically following reform, despite a drop in subsidies.  Whereas
DEG was losing large amounts before reform, SEEG quickly became profitable.  By 1996,
SEEG's profits reached GF 3.2 billion ($3.2 million in  1996 dollars).  The increase in
SEEG's  accounting profits after 1993 coincided with a decrease in the  'rental  fee'  that
SEEG paid to SONEG. Although the average consumer rate remained at GF 880 between
1994 and 1996, the share of the tariff that SEEG paid to SONEG fell from GF 527 in 1994
to GF 370 in 1996.
68 The difference  in the two  indicators  is probably  primarily  due  to the large  increase  in 'miscellaneous'.
Although water sales increased relatively slowly following reform, revenues from construction and other
works related to the water sector increased more quickly. Consequently, output per employee continued to
perform better.
32In  1989-90,  SONEG
lost  about  $2.8  million  (see
$15.  Figure  9).  After  slowly
$lo  -improving  through  1995,
SONEG's  operating  profit
became  negative  (-$4.1
.0  $o  _  *  \  million) once more in  1996.
E1  d1  1993  1995  The decline  is due to the sharp
drop  in  the  'rental  fee'  that
-+Accounting  Profits  (SONEG)  SEEG paid to SONEG and the
--AccounUing  Profits  (SEEG)  end of  the  subsidy that the
-hPublic  Profits
government paid  SONEG for
Figure  9: Private  and  Public  Profits  debt  service (GF  88/m 3 in
Note:  Private  profits  for DEG  before  privatization.  1994).  Although  SONEG
appeared profitable  in  1995,
this was due to a large increase in non-operating income (from GF 396,000 in 1994 to GF
9.6 billion in  1995).  Without this, SONEG would have shown losses of close to  $3.7
million in 1995.  Figure 9 also shows 'public profits' since reform, which include returns
to debt-holders (i.e., interest payments), to the government (i.e., net taxes), depreciation
and omits the opportunity cost of both SEEG's and SONEG's working capital. 69 Public
profits, which were only slightly greater than zero under public ownership, increased in
magnitude following  reform.
6.2  Challenges that Remain
Although  sector  performance has  improved  along  most  dimensions,  several
challenges remain.  First, as noted in the previous section, although performance has
improved, many of the changes have been quite modest, especially considering the poor
initial performance of the sector.  For example, although the coverage rate has increased
despite rapid population growth, it has increased more slowly than originally projected and
remains far below the coverage rate in the top performing countries in the regions (e.g.,
C6te d'Ivoire).  Similarly, total factor and labor productivity did not increase significantly
after the first  year and the private collection rate,  although improved, remains  low.
Second, two other performance indicators, unaccounted for water (UFW) and the public
collection rate remain poor.  The thing that most people complained about, however, was
the high price of water.  As noted earlier, although it is difficult to compare prices across
cases,  tariffs are quite high  in  Guinea compared to  the other case  studies.  In  this
69  Depreciation  is included  to avoid  the use of accountants'  rates. See  Galal  et al. (1994)  and  Jones  et al.
(1991)  for a full  description.
33subsection, we discuss these final issues: unaccounted for water, public collection and
reasons for the high prices.
Unaccounted for  water.  As  noted  in  Section n,  estimates of  UFW  varied
considerably before reform.  By 1996, when metering was complete, UFW stood at about
48% (World Bank, 1998a). 70 Although it is difficult to say whether UFW has improved, it is
high compared to either international  standards (between 10 and 20%) or to other systems in
West Africa (See Figure 10).  Several factors contribute to the high rate of UFW.  First,
although it is very difficult to estimate the number of illegal connections accurately, it
appears to be a large problem, especially in sections of the city where the old pipes are
buried only a few inches underground.  This makes it easy to  connect to the  system
illegally and means that the pipes are easily broken (e.g., by heavy vehicles). Officials from
SEEG note that it is very difficult, in the existing institutional environment, to prosecute
persons with illegal connections and, therefore, other than cutting the connections off, the
company can do little to deter this behavior.  Second, overlapping lots and interlaced
households, especially in the older parts of the city, can make it difficult to interrupt water
supply and control connections.  Finally, poor maintenance and ancient infrastructure  also
contributes  to the UFW problem.
One of the causes of the
70% - high rate of UFW is that SEEG,
60% - which  is  responsible  for  a
50%-  substantial share of maintenance,
40% - *  has  little  incentive to  reduce
30%  - UFW.  The  expansion  of  the
30%-_  . _
20% - Grande  Chutes  pipeline  means
10%  - that potential production outstrips
0%  -1  ~~~~~~~~both  consumption  anld  actual
Cote  Togo  Benin  Burkino  Senegal  Guinea Guinea  production.  Consequently,  SEEG
d'lvoire  1992  1993  Faso  1992  1996  1985  can  continue to  increase the
1996  1993  (est.)  number of  connections  without
Figure 10: Unaccounted for Water  reducing UFW. Moreover, SEEG
pays  the rental  fee to  SONEG
Source:  World Bank.  based on bills collected, not  on
water produced and delivered by
SONEG. Since  SEEG does not pay for raw water and does not lose sales due to UFW, it has
little if any incentive  to reduce it.
70 95% of connections were metered by 1996 and, therefore, it is easier to estimate UFW accurately.
34Some  experts  argue  that  reducing  UFW  is  not  that  important  in  Conakry,
considering the  considerable resources  available and  the  high  cost  of  a  significant
rehabilitation program.  Although SEEG's accounts are not detailed enough for precise
estimates, since the system is gravity-fed  and most costs (e.g., provisioning and debt service)
do not depend upon the quantity of water provided, short run marginal costs are probably
quite low.  For this reason, it is probably not efficient in strict economic terns  to  spend
significant amounts reducing UFW.  Although with hindsight it might be argued that the
productive capacity added under the Second Water Project could have been delayed if UFW
had been reduced,  this was not clear when the project was proposed. UFW was thought to be
considerably lower before metering was complete and, therefore, consumption was thought
to be close to productive capacity. 7"
Despite these arguments, the high rate of unaccounted for water might be costly in
other ways.  First, UFW can be  a  source of pollution and  disease, especially where
drainage is poor.  Water obtained through illegal connections is poor quality, especially
when stored in unsanitary conditions, and leaky pipes can affect water quality through the
entire systern. Second, it is hard to convince people of the long run economic cost of water
(and, therefore, the necessity of paying for it) when they know that large amounts are
simply being wasted (especially when the leaks are quite visible).  Finally, the high rate
reflects other problems in the system - most notably, the poor quality of the infrastructure
and the inability, or at least unwillingness, of the population to pay current prices.
Public collection rate.  Another problem that faces the sector is the low collection
rate from the public sector. Although the private operator's is not to blame - the collection
rate was low before reform and a private operator can do little to  force an unwilling
government to pay in a weak institutional environment  - this has clearly been a problem.
For the first two years of the lease, under donor pressure, the government paid its bill
regularly (See Figure 6).  However, in 1991 the govenmment  collection rate fell to less than
50%, and then dropped firther, to close to 10%, in 1993. Since the govermnent accounted
for about 30% of sales - and more before 1996 - this has been a significant problem for the
private operator.  Large fixed costs are passed on to a small number of private consumers
who actually pay their bills, increasing the price significantly  (see below).
71  Before  reform,  productive  capacity  was about 54,000  m3/day (World  Bank, 1989). In 1996,  by
which  time metering  was complete,  billed consumption  was only about 30,255  m3/day. This  would  leave
some space for UFW and for seasonal  variation  in consumption  (which  is quite low in Guinea)  without
increasing  productive  capacity. However,  because  the estimate  of UFW was too low, it was unclear at the
time  of reform  that  actual  consumption  was that low. Further,  it was  hoped that  the number  of connections
would  grow  faster  that  they actually  did.
35The high price of water.  The most common complaint during field interviews was
that the price of water was too high. 72 In general, it is very difficult to compare prices
across countries. First, tariff schemes vary greatly across countries - for example, it is hard
to compare prices in countries that are fully metered with those where customers pay lump-
sum tariffs.  Second, the cost of providing water also varies greatly between countries.  For
example, whereas the water system in Conakry is gravity fed, water in Mexico City has to
be pumped from a source that is 140 kilometers away and 1000 meters below the city.  On
the other hand, Conakry's system is far smaller and less dense than the systems in the other
case  studies,  increasing  costs  in  Conakry.  Finally,  water systems  are  often  heavily
subsidized (often in  non-transparent ways), making comparisons even more difficult.
Unlike systems in many other developing countries, Conakry's system provides sufficient
revenues to cover operations and maintenance and service sector debt. Finally, since prices
are adjusted infrequently, and the devaluation rate in many African countries is extremely
fast, it often difficult to compare prices in US dollars at a single point in time.  With these
provisos, however, prices in Guinea do appear high, especially when compared to the Latin
American case studies (see Figure 11).
When compared to other
African  countries,  prices  in
$1.20  Guinea  remain  higher  than
$1.00  average,  although  not
$0.80  _  completely  unreasonable  (see
$0.60  - Figure 11).  One final point is
$0.40  that  the  tariff  for  low-income
$0.20  _  *  |  1ll  _  _  *  *  *  *  *  *  consumers  in  Guinea  is  high
$0.00  compared to  tariffs  for  similar
,  DG^G  --G  teCr  rconsumers  in  other  countries.
iA,  OA  C-  O  O  C  O  Cv  .°  '°  a  U  For  example,  although  the
average  tariff  in  the  mid-1990s
was  higher in  Uganda  than  in
Guinea  ($0.96  vs.  $0.84),  the
Figure 11: Average Price Per Cubic Meter Billed in Africa  metered tariff for domestic users
and Latin America
was  lower in  Uganda  than the
Source: Menard and Shirley (2000) and World Bank files.  'social'  tariff  for  low-income
users  in  Guinea($0.57  vs.
$0.64).7
72  Similarly, the  organization for consumer protection  wrote "living  standards  in  Guinea make  it
impossible to pay the price charged by SEEG" (World Bank, 1998,  p.32)
7  Data for Uganda is for 1995 from Dinar and Subramanian (1997).
36In general, it is hard
to  assess  why  prices  are
$25.0  . higher  in  Guinea  than  in
8$20.0*
$15.0  other  African  and  Latin
s  $I0.0  =  American  countries.  Figure
- $5.0  12 show the division of both
$0.0.  revenues  from  water  sales
90  91  92  93  94  95  96  and  total  revenues  for  the
EWater  Revenue  - SONEG  EWater Revenue  -SEEG  post  reform  period.  SEEG
3 Miscellaneous  Revenues  -SEEG  receives  a  greater  share  of
Figure 12: Revenues for Water  Sales and 'Other' (million  both total revenues and water
1996 US$)  revenues than SONEG (about
65% of  water revenues and
Note:  Revenue  from  water sales  includes  connection  charges.  about 74% of total revenues
Source:  SONEG.  in  1996).  Since SONEG
finances most of its activities
through grants and loans, this is not surprising (see Clarke, Menard, and Zuluaga, 2000).
Expenditures  on
70%  - ____________________________________wages  and  intermediate
60% - inputs,  for  SEEG  and
50%  SONEG  combined,
30%  consumed  between  48
20%  percent  and  62  percent  of
10%pecn
0%  |  total revenue between  1989
89  90  91  92  93  94  95  96  and 1996. Since SEEG is far
rmediate____  Inputs_  larger  than  SONEG  (500
*Wages *IntermediateInputs  employees  at  SEEG
Figure 13: Wages and Intermediate  Inputs (as % of total  compared to 44 at SONEG in
revenues)  1997),  expenditures  on
Note:  Includes wages, intermediate  inputs and revenues for  wages  and  intermediate
SEEG  and  SONEG.  inputs  are  primarily
Source:  SONEG.  expenditures  by  SEEG.  In
1996,  SEEG  accounted for
90%  of  total  wage  expenditures and  87%  of  expenditures on  intermediate inputs.
According to  field interviews, the  salaries for the  five expatriate managers at  SEEG
accounted for about 15% of expenditures on wages and salaries in 1994-1995 (i.e., only
about 1.6% of total revenues).  Consequently, they are clearly not the main cause of the
high price of water.
37By  1996,  interest
payments  and  repayment  of
50%  principle  consumed,
40%  respectively,  about  17%  and
30%  19%  of  revenues  from  water
20%  sales.  We  compare  interest
-%  __payments  and the repayment of
prnciple  with  revenues  from
0%  water  sales,  rather  than  total
90  91  92  93  94  95  96
revenues,  because  these
|  Interest  Payments  (%  of  water  sales)  payments are made by SONEG,
|  Repayment  of Principle  (%  of water  sales)  which  receives  revenue  only
from water sales.  Between 1990
Figure  14: Interest  Payments  and  Debt Service  (as percentage  and  1996,  interest  payments  on
of revenue  from water  sales)  sector debt  increased  from  about
Note: Includes  revenues  from water sales  and connection  charges  $2.0  to  $2.8  million  (in  1996
(i.e., excludes 'miscellaneous'  revenues for SEEG).  Between  US$). 74 Since  1996,  principal
1990 and  1995, interest  payments  include expenditures  on debt  repayment  on  loans  from  the
service by the government.
Source: SONEG and authors' calculations.  Second  Water  Supply  Project
has  increased  and  new  loans
have been taken out under the Third Water Supply and Sanitation Project.  Consequently,
interest payments and principal repayment was projected to  increase significantly after
1996 - SONEG projected that interest and principal repayment would increase by 226
percent by 2005.  Consequently, without large increases in coverage or prices, the share of
revenue consumed by debt service is likely to grow.
7  Note that the estimate for 1990 includes debt service expenditures by the governmnent  between  1990
and  1995,since it subsidized debt  service payment  over  this period (see below).  Consequently, actual
payments by SONEG were considerably lower between 1990 and 1995.
38As  discussed  in  the
previous  section, both  public
35%  I  and  private  collection  rates,
30%  - although higher than they were
25%-  before privatization, have been
20%-  - C  consistently  quite  low.
15%  |  Consequently,  provisions  for
10%  I  bad  debt  consume  a  large
portion of revenue.  In  1996, 0%1-
90  91  92  93  94  95  96  provisioning for bad loans cost
SEEG and SONEG about $3.0
|  Provisions  for Bad  Debt  (%  of  water sales)  million  (in  1996 US$)  - about
18.4% of revenue from water
Figure  15: Provisions  for Bad Debts  (as % of water  sales).  sales.  In  comparison,  for
Note:  Includes revenues and  provisions by  both  SEEG and  SODECI  in  C6te  d'Lvoire
SONEG.  Revenues  include  connection  charges  (i.e.,  they  provisions  for  bad  debt
exclude  'miscellaneous'  revenues).  accounted for only about 2.8%
Source: SONEG. Source:  SONEG.  of  (pre-tax)  revenues.
Improving  billing,  through
both improving government payment and making it easier for SEEG to collect from non-
paying private customers, would allow SEEG to reduce prices quite substantially.
Given that  the government accounts for  a significant part  of the  non-payment
problem, one way to ensure lower prices would be for the government to pays its water bill
in a timely manner.  Similarly, legal reform that makes it easier for SEEG to prosecute
people who connect illegally, or who refuse to pay  their water bill, would also reduce
financial pressure on the two water companies. A bill presented by the government to that
effect, under pressures from international donors, was killed by the Parliament in 1996.
This event illustrates the importance of political pressure on pricing and collection issues,
even when private sector is involved.
7.  Welfare Effects of Reform
This  section presents a  brief description of results  from a  cost-benefit analysis
based upon the methodology in Jones et al. (1991) and Galal et al. (1994).  In the analysis,
we compare the actual performance of the sector following reform (the 'actual'  scenario)
with expected performance if the reform had not taken place (the 'counterfactual' scenario)
for the  ten years  following reform. 75 Clarke, Menard  and  Zuluaga  (2000) present  a
7  We analyze performance for ten years after the reform for comparability with the other case studies
and because the original lease contract was only for ten years, providing a natural break for the analysis.
39complete description of the welfare analysis, including data deficiencies, other problems
and a sensitivity analysis.
We believe that the results in this section present a conservative estimate of the
benefits of the reform for two reasons. First, we are not able to assess the potentially large
benefits to consumers from improved service and water quality since it is very difficult to
value these gains.  Second, the counterfactual  relies heavily upon DEG's pre-privatization
accounts. Since the unaudited accounts probably overstate DEG's success, we are likely to
overestimate performance in the counterfactual scenario and, therefore, underestimate the
gains from reform.  For example, since we are using DEG's profit and loss statement,
which records transactions as billed, we implicitly assume that DEG would have actually
collected (or provisioned for) the amount billed. However, DEG had a very poor collection
record and provisioning appears inadequate. Since we rely upon these figures to construct
the counterfactual, and because we omit the gains from improved quality, the estimated
gains from reform should be seen as a lower bound on its likely effect.
We estimate consumer surplus for three categories of demand: water supplied to
private consumers, water supplied to the government, and connection fees. 76 Although,
under ideal circumstances,  we would like a finer breakdown for demand, this is impossible
because neither revenue nor volume of water billed was broken down more finely.  Since
neither SEEG nor DEG was responsible for providing sewerage services, we do not include
sewerage in this partial equilibrium analysis.  The main category of consumption is water
consumed by private (i.e., non-government) consumers. We assume a high price elasticity
of demand (-0.6), although, in practice, the results are similar for a large range of price
elasticities. 77 The second category of revenues is revenue from.  government consumption.
B3ecause  of this, there is a two-year  'projection  period' for which we use prelimiinary  and estimated  data
(1997 and 1998). In practice,  the discount  factors  applied  after 1998  would  make future years relatively
unimportant.  The projection  period  is described  more fully  Clarke,  Menard  and Zuluaga  (2000),  which also
presents  results  making  alternative  assumptions  about  projections.
76  For the final category  of "miscellaneous"  revenues,  we do not calculate  consumer  surplus. Before
1989, 'miscellaneous'  revenue  is 'works invoiced'  in DEG's accounts. After 1989,  most 'miscellaneous'
revenue  probably  comes from the construction  of water infrastructure  performed  by SEEG on behalf of
SONEG. If SEEG  and SONEG  were a single  company,  the company  would  not receive  any revenue  from
'construction'  (other  than  for the connection  fee) and,  therefore,  this would  not appear  as separate  source  of
revenue.  For comparability  with  the counterfactual,  therefore,  we  do not calculate  consumer  surplus  for this
category. Further,  since  this is a 'catch-all'  category,  it would  be difficult  to make  assumptions  regarding
excess  demand  and  price  elasticity  of demand.
77  To compute  consumer  surplus  we follow the methodology  outlined in Shirley,  Xu and Zuluaga
(1999). The most  important  assumptions  that we make are about excess  demand  and  the price elasticity  of
demand. We assume  that  there  was no excess  demand  in 1998. This  seems  reasonable,  given that  only 10%
of Conakry  residents  indicated  they would  be willing  to pay the cost of a service  connection  and most said
they would  not be willing  to pay the average  consumer  tariff  (World  Bank, 1997). We use this, along  with
an assumed  demand  elasticity,  to calculate  the demand  curve in 1998. In the other  years, we simply  shift
40The final part is connection fees.  Following Galal et al. (1994), we subtract connections
fees from  consumer surplus for water consumption.  The implicit assumption is  that
consumers gain utility from water usage, not from the connection itself.  Hence, potential
consumers compare the  net present value of  consumer surplus from  usage with  the
connection fee and the stream of tariff payments.
7.1  Differences between Actual and Counterfactual  Scenarios
In this case study, the counterfactual  scenario differs from the actual scenario in the
following ways.  First, we assume that the World Bank supported Second Water Project
would not have been approved and that, therefore, investment would have remained low.
Second, we assume that labor productivity  would remain poor.  Third, we assume that the
large price increases that followed reform would not have been implemented.  Finally,
given the above assumptions, we  assume that the  government would  have increased
subsidies to cover DEG's  operating losses on a cash-flow basis.  This final assumption is
necessary given the second and third assumptions.
Investment.  The assumption that the World Bank would not have approved the
second water project without some degree of private sector participation is supported by
World Bank documents and discussions with World Bank staff involved in the project.
Since most investment was supported through donor funding, we assume, therefore, that
DEG would only perform sufficient investment to maintain assets (i.e., that investment
would be equal to real depreciation).  Because of this, there is no output growth in the
counterfactual scenario.  This is consistent with two observations.  First, since average
daily production in Conakry was about 45,000m 3/day and maximum average production
was estimated to be 54,000m 3, it appears that little system expansion would be possible in
demand by  population growth. Abdala (1997) reports a range of price elasticities for water demand in
developing countries, mostly between -0.2 and -0.6.  However, none are for Africa and most are presumably
for connected  consumers. These might not be appropriate  for Guinea since much of the change in demand in
Guinea is presumably due to decisions by customers who choose to connect (disconnect) when prices are
lowered (raised). The World Bank Water Demand Research Team (1993, p.54) reports that their elasticities
for willingness to connect to an improved source of water with respect to the average monthly bill were
surprisingly large in rural areas.  They estimate elasticities of -0.7 and -0.4 for willingness to use public taps
in Zimbabwe and Kenya and elasticities of -1.5,  -0.7 and -0.7 for willingness to use private connections in
India, Brazil and Pakistan.  The experience with reform in Guinea suggests that the elasticity for willingness
to connect in urban areas of Guinea might also be large.  In 1994, Brook-Cowen (1996) reports that nearly
12,000 connections were inactive due to non-payment (compared to about 20,000  active connections).
Further, World Bank (1998, p.  5) reports that consumers refusing to re-connect after being disconnected
from the system for non-payment continued to be a problem after 1995. One plausible reason for this is that
urban consumers  have easy access to water from wells for much of the year. In Clarke, Menard and Zuluaga
(2000), we present results for a range of elasticities and making different assumptions about excess demand.
41Conakry  without  upgrading productive  capacity. 78 However,  the  expansion of  the
production capacity would not have been possible at the observed level of investment in
the late 1980s.79  Second, between the end of the First Water Project (1984) and the start of
the second water project (1989), there was little or no system expansion. 80 Since assumed
investment under the counterfactual  is slightly lower than the observed average investment
in 1987 and 1988, the assumption of no expansion seems generous. 8'
Productivity.  In the welfare analysis, we assume that the improved productivity
observed following reform was a result of the reform.  This seems reasonable, since there
is little evidence of increased productivity before reform.  Although poor data quality
makes  it  difficult to  assess  factor  productivity accurately prior  to  1989,  estimated
consumption and the number of connections were falling and the number of staff was
steady in the mid 1980s, suggesting labor productivity was falling.
Prices.  We assume that the large price increases observed following reform were
contingent on reform.  This is reasonable for several reasons.  First, given DEG's  poor
collection performance when prices were low, it seems unlikely that DEG would have been
able to  collect billed  amounts if  prices were  raised.  Second, it  seems unlikely  that
consumers would have borne the price increases without corresponding improvements in
quality, which would have required additional investment. Finally, in the actual scenario,
the private operator has  an  incentive to  push the government and  SONEG for price
increases. This motivation would have been missing under public ownership. In fact, most
increases in the 1970s and  1980s appear to have been implemented only under donor
pressure.  Consequently, under the counterfactual  scenario of continued public ownership,
with no additional donor funds for investments, we assume that prices would have stayed
constant in real terms at the 1988 tariff rate.
7  Pre-reform data is for 1984 - the last year before reform that reliable data is available (World Bank,
1987, p. 38).  Maximum capacity was 60,000m 3/day, but this could not be maintained as an average level of
production (World Bank, 1989,  p. 45).
7  World Bank (1989) reports that the estimated cost of the transmission pipes from Grandes Chutes to
Conakry and the additional treatment plant to treat the water was US$38.8 million (of US$57.9 million in
total investments in Conakry).  However, actual costs were probably higher since total expenditures on
planned investments in Conakry were US$84.9 mnillion  (rather than US$57.9 million).  Total investrnent by
DEG averaged $4.7 million in 1987 and 1988 and much of this would be required for maintenance etc.
80  Between 1984 and  1988, in Conakry, registered connections fell from 11,167 to about 10,200 and
active standpipes fell from  112 to 40, while (nationally) estimated consumption fell from  12.83 million
m3/year to 10.89 million m3/year.  Connection data from World Bank (1987, p. 38) and World Bank (1989,
p. 33) and standpipe data from World Bank (1987, p.38) and World Bank (1989, p. 3).  Consumption data
from World Bank (1987, p. 38) and World Bank (1989).
8'  This is also consistent with assumptions in World Bank documents about sector growth if the Second
Water Supply Project had not occurred.
42Subsidies.  Before reform, even after the large subsidies DEG received from the
Government,  DEG was losing large amounts of money. These large losses would not have
been  sustainable  without  additional  borrowing  or  an  infusion  of  capital  from  the
government (i.e., an increase in the subsidy).  DEG's financial position was too weak to
borrow significant amounts from private capital markets and donors such as the World
Bank generally do not lend money to finance operating losses.  Therefore, we assume that
the govermment  would have increased the subsidy to make the company's cash flow close
to zero.  In the counterfactual scenario, therefore, subsidies increase from $3.15 million in
1988 to $4.4 million in 1996 (in 1996 US$).  This assumption means that subsidies are
slightly lower in the counterfactual scenario than in the actual scenario through 1992.82
After 1992, subsidies stabilize at about $4.4 million in the counterfactual  scenario, whereas
they drop to zero in the actual scenario. 83
7.2  Welfare  Impact
Table 1 presents results from the welfare analysis.  Under the scenario described
above, the total welfare gain was over $33 million (in 1996 dollars). Most of this accrued
to  domestic parties.  Even ignoring the presumably large gains due to improvements in
service  and  water  quality,  private  consumers benefited  considerably  from  reform.
Although the large price increase might have reduced the utility of connected customers,
especially those disconnected for non-payment, this appears to have been more than offset
by gains accruing to new consumers.
The government benefited considerably in fiscal terms, although the increased price
of water meant that the government lost consumer surplus. The reason that the government
lost  consumer surplus, while  private  consumers  gained  is  that  private  consumption
increased considerably between 1989 and 1996, while government consumption dropped.
That  is,  since government consumption was  not  rationed before reform, government
consumers did not benefit from expanded coverage. It is important to note that the loss in
consumer surplus to  the government is calculated based upon the assumption that the
government pays its water bill (in time and in full).  Since this has not been the case, the
'true' price of water to government is likely to be considerably less than the assumed price
8  In the actual scenario, the governnent  subsidized sector operations in two ways.  First, it paid  a
declining share of  debt service for  the first five years following reform. In  addition, the World Bank
provided a loan that was used to subsidize a declining share of the tariff (i.e. to subsidize SEEG's operating
expenses).  Since this money was provided through a loan guaranteed by the government, we treat this as a
government subsidy  to SEEG in our analysis.
83 It appears that the level of subsidies that are envisioned under the counterfactual scenario would be
feasible for the government in the medium term.  In  1987, the subsidy was equivalent to  about 1% of
government consumption.  Under the  counterfactual scenario, this  subsidy increases to  only  1.6% of
governrnent consumption  by 1996.
43in this study.  Foreign buyers benefited modestly fromi  reformn,  although their gain was
small compared to the gain that accrued to consumers and to the government.
In Clarke, M6nard and Zuluaga (2000), we present additional results making other
assumptions in the actual and counterfactual scenarios (e.g., about elasticities and excess
demand). In practice, the results were not highly sensitive to the different assumptions and
were similar to the results here (at least) qualitatively.
Table 1: Winners and Losers from Reform in First Ten Years of Reform
Total gain  Gain
(millions 1996  Per capita gain  (as % of]1988
US$)  (1996 US$)  output)
Total  $33.2  $6.12  126.6%
Total Domestic  $29.3  $5.41  111.9%
Government  - ~~~~~~$9.8$18  37.4%
.FiScal  Effect  $17.6  $3.25  67.2%
Government Consumer Surplus  -$7.8  -$1.44  -29.8%
Consumers  $19.5  $~~~~  ~  ~~~~~3.6  74.5%
. .... ir;eign  B-uyers  -- $3.9  $0.71  14.7%
8.  Conclusion
Our cost-benefit analysis suggests that overall both consumers and the government
gained from reformn. The most notable achievement is that government subsidies have
been sharply reduced, with revenues now covering the operational expenditures of both
SEEG and SONEG and, for the most part, debt service.  However, consumers have also
benefited.  Although the increase in the number of connections has been slower than
anticipated and, therefore, coverage remains low, it has increased faster than it would have
under continued public ownership.  Further, the quality of both water and service have
improved considerably  - safe drinking water is now available 24-hours a day, seven days a
week.  In summary, there is little doubt that the situation is better than it would have been
under any reasonable counterfactual  with continued public ownership.
However, there have been some problems,  e.g., water has become very expensive, the
numnber  of connections has increased very slowly, and conflicts have developed between
SEEG and SONEG.  Our analysis strongly suggests that the fundamnental  cause of these
problems is the lack of strong and stable institutions, the effect of which is amplified  by a set
of contracts without adequate mechanisms for  solving  disputes among  the parties  involved.
Although progress has been made towards strengthening  parliament and the judiciary, there
44are few effective checks and balances on the executive. In particular, the judiciary lacks
expertise and constitutional support, particularly in implementing contracts and protecting
property rights.  Consequently, there is no independent authority to  monitor the lease
contract effectively or to make sure that the partners meet their goals and obligations.
Because of this, the private operator does not have adequate incentives, disputes have not
been resolved, and regulation has been weak. In what follows, we summarize the main
problems  and we indicate directions  for improving  the contractual  arrangement.
High prices.  As noted in Menard and Shirley (1999),  prices in Guinea are far higher
than in any of the other case studies in this project as well as in neighboring countries,
notwithstanding  abundant water resources. There are several  possible reasons for this. First,
as noted by several experts during field interviews, the system is smaller than the other
systems, meaning that it might not benefit from economies of scale.  Moreover, because
connections are spread over a large area, the network is not very dense, increasing  the capital
cost of providing service. However, this is not the only reason for high prices - operating
costs are also higher than in the other case studies. 84 This is somewhat surprising since the
system is gravity-fed  and raw water is readily available.
Another factor that has led to high prices is that, although SEEG has improved
collection and billing, the improvements  have been smaller than originally  hoped. Collection
rates for both the administration and the private sector are low and the high rate of UFW
suggests that theft and illegal connections  are still significant  problems.  In 1996, less than
33% of the water that was produced  was actually  paid for, making  higher prices necessary for
those consumers who do pay.  The most important action that the government could take
would be  to  pay its  own water bill.  However, the Government could also encourage
Parliament to pass the measure allowing SEEG to collect from non-payers - the earlier
rejection of this bill has almost certainly contributed  to the low collection rate.  The final
cause  is  weak  regulation.  World  Bank  (1998a)  reports  that  audits  revealed  that
misapplication of the formulas that adjust prices in response to  cost changes resulted in
overvalued tariffs. Because of this, and the informal price negotiations  between SEEG and
the  Government, the private operator receives far  greater compensation than originally
anticipated. 85 Although this is due, in part, to a lack of administrative  capacity at SONEG,
SEEG has failed to provide the information  to SONEG that is required under the contract.
This suggests that steps should be taken to strengthen SONEG and to  increase SEEG's
compliance  with reporting  requirements. However,  as discussed  below, other steps to reduce
information  asymmetries  may also be helpful.
S4  Operating  costs  per connection  and  per cubic  meter  of water  produced  are both  higher  than  in the other
case  studies.
85 In Guinea,  the lease  contractor  rate- the part of the  tariff  paid  to SEEG  - was  supposed  to be 214  GF/m 3
(in  current  GF)  in 1993. In practice,  it turned  out  to be 448  GF/rn 3.
45Low connection rate.  The second problem, the slow expansion of the system, is the
result of both the high price and institutional problems. World Bank (1  997a, p. 13) reports
that although 75% of households expressed a strong interest in individual connections, only
10% of these households were willing to pay the full cost of being connected. Further, most
were not willing to pay the average consumer rate of GF 880/m 3. However, if the connection
fee was subsidized, so that the price was GF 40,000 (about $37 in 1997) and they paid the
social tariff (GF 680/m 3), most households indicated that they would be willing to connect.
This suggests that a more vigorous 'social connection' program, similar to the program in
Cote d'Ivoire, could successfully increase the connection rate.  Consistent with this, support
for 'social connections' by bilateral donors appears  to have successfully  increased the number
of connections in 1997 and 1998. Between 1989 and 1996, only about 10,000 connections
were added nationally. In comparison, nearly 8000 connections were added in 1997 alone.
However, this  is  not  the  only  reason  for  the  slow  system  expansion.  In  addition,
disagreements between SEEG and SONEG have made it difficult for the two parties to
coordinate their investment plans, slowing expansion. In the absence of a credible dispute
resolution mechanism,  these disagreements  have seriously damaged the relationship between
the two entities and have taken a significant  amount of time and effort to resolve. Although
several apparently  useful clauses intended to reduce this were included in the contract, in the
absence of a credible body to interpret and enforce them, the clauses have been almost
impossible to implement.
Coordination and  disputes.  Several steps could be taken to reduce coordination
problems, and resulting disagreements,  between SONEG and SEEG.  Many local officials
believe that  imposing strict deadlines on  SONEG regarding investment could  increase
expansion  without giving too much discretionary  power to SEEG. However, given the weak
adrninistrative  capacity and institutions in Guinea, it is unclear whether these rules could be
enforced.  In fact, because transaction costs are lower for the private operator, in many
cases, it may often be economically and socially reasonable to give greater discretion to
SEEG regarding investments.  This would also  improve SEEG's  incentives regarding
system expansion. However, it could also increase the capacity for SEEG to capture rent.
Increasing expertise at SONEG would help reducing this risk. 86
The  private  operator  could  be  motivated  to  take  greater  initiative  if  its
responsibilities were increased.  For example, it should be  responsible  for day-to-day
investment decisions for both the primary and secondary networks.  Simultaneously, its
autonomy should be increased by  allowing it to borrow more easily.  Expected results
should be specified in the contract, for example, by fixing precise goals for connections.
By taking daily investment decision away from it, SONEG would be able to focus on long
86 Abidjan provides an example with that regard (see Menard and Clarke, 2000).
46term planning and on monitoring SEEG. For such a solution to work efficiently, SONEG
would need to  acquire greater autonomy and expertise.  Taking into consideration the
institutional  endowment  of  Guinea,  this  likely  involves  greater  commitment  from
international donors.  Although a  concession may not be possible  in  Guinea, moving
towards a system similar to the one in Cote d'Ivoire (see Menard and Clarke, 2000), where
most investment decisions are made by  the private operator, would probably improve
sector performance.
More immediate steps could also be taken. In particular,  one cause of the problems
noted above is that different ministries with diverging views interfere with both SEEG and
SONEG, creating confusion and resulting in arbitrary decision-making. At the very least,
SEEG and SONEG should have boards that are independent from short-term government
policy and from each other. Further, SONEG, which is a public agency, should depend on
only one Ministry or regulating agency.
Steps could also be taken to reduce information  asymmetries. The traditional way of
doing this is through using bidding procedures  to allocate contracts or introducing  yardstick
competition. However, in Guinea, these devices are likely to be only partially effective.
Although bidding was used in 1989, only two consortia actually submitted bids.  Given the
lack of an independent  judiciary able to enforce  contracts  and the dearth of information  on the
actual situation  - about all that was known was that the system was collapsing  - this was not
surprising. This lack of interest severely limits the government's capacity to pressure the
winner with  subsequent rounds of  bidding.  Further, two  of  the  three  international
companies with a significant  presence in Africa - SAUR and Vivendi (Generale des Eaux)
- are already partners in SEEG.  Finally, although information regarding the system has
improved, SEEG clearly has  a  significant information advantage over  any  potential
competitors in the next round of bidding.  However, this asymmetry can be reduced by
contractually obliging SEEG to reveal more information and by building up expertise at
SONEG.
Another problem with bidding is that the weak institutional environment in Guinea
makes informal re-negotiation of contract provisions possible.  This severely reduces the
information that bidding provides (i.e., the enterprises participating in the bidding have no
reason to submit bids based upon estimates of the cost of producing water since they know
they can re-negotiate the price afterwards).  This has been a constant problem in water
sector and  particularly in  cases  (e.g.,  Guinea and  Argentina) in  which  bidding was
conducted over prices.
Yardstick  competition  is almost impossible,  since  Conakry is far larger than any other
city in Guinea, making comparisons  difficult. Unbundling the system geographically  (i.e.,
dividing Conakry into several areas managed by different companies)  could allow a regulator
to compare some aspects of the performance of different companies.  This solution was
47adopted in Mexico, with unconvincing  results so far (see Brook Cowen and Haggarty, 1999)
and, more successfully,  in cities like Paris. Although, this deserves serious consideration  in
Guinea, the small system and the relatively low number of international  companies likely to
bid on these contracts  would make it difficult  to implement  efficiently.
In  conclusion, although the lease has been successful in  some ways, the actual
improvements  have not been as large as it was hoped they would. The main problems have
been weak  administrative capacity and the  lack of an  independent agency capable of
restraining arbitrary government action, regulating the private operator and enforcing the
contractual arrangement.  Although these problems ultimately require long-term solutions,
we have outlined several steps that could be taken more immediately. Among these, building
expertise at the micro institutional level, (e.g., within SONEG) is likely the key to rapid
improvement.
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